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ABSTRACT 
 
GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA’S CAUCASUS POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE WORLD  
Tekir, Gökhan 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone 
May, 2014 
This thesis examines an overlooked region in the discipline of international relations, the 
Caucasus. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused the independence of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, which comprise the South Caucasus. The North Caucasus 
remained under the control of the Russian Federation but the Russian Federation had to 
deal with separatist movements in the North Caucasus. Despite military and economic 
costs, Russia tries to hold on the region.  
The withdrawal of Russian rule from the South Caucasus led to the belief that newly 
established republics would join to the Western camp immediately. The South Caucasus 
emerged as a big energy prize for the European Union, which wants to diversify its 
energy transportation routes. However, regional conflicts and Russian presence, which 
increased gradually has prevented this opportunity. Russia has managed to establish a 
dominant presence in the region. 
This study claims that Russia’s Caucasus policy rests upon geopolitical considerations. 
Russia ensures that the Caucasus will remain under its sphere of influence in order to 
provide its security and reestablish its great power status in international arena. Russia’s 
goals in the region are frequently challenged by external powers. In order to maintain its 
hegemonic position in the region, Russia struggles with other external powers. 
 
Key Words: Geopolitics, Russian policy, The Caucasus, Energy   
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ÖZET 
 
RUSYA’NIN KAFKASYA POLİTİKASININ JEOPOLİTİĞİ VE DÜNYA 
ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ 
Tekir, Gökhan  
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Norman Stone 
Mayıs 2014 
Bu tez uluslararası ilişkiler alanında ihmal edilmiş bir bölge olan Kafkasya’yı 
incelemektedir. Sovyetler Birliği’nin çöküşü Güney Kafkasya’yı oluşturan Gürcistan, 
Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan’ın bağımsızlıklarına neden olmuştur. Kuzey Kafkasya Rusya 
Federasyonu’nun bir parçası olarak kalmış fakat Rusya Federasyonu Kuzey Kafkasya’da 
ayrılıkçı hareketlerle uğraşmak zorunda kalmıştır. Ekonomik ve askeri bedellere rağmen 
Rusya bu bölgedeki varlığını devam ettirmektedir.  
Güney Kafkasya’daki Rus yönetiminin çekilmesi yeni bağımsızlıklarını kazanmış 
ülkelerin Batı kampına dahil olacakları inancını doğurdu. Güney Kafkasya, enerji 
yollarında çeşitlilik sağlama amacında olan Avrupa Birliği için büyük bir enerji merkezi 
olarak ortaya çıktı. Fakat, bölgesel çatışmalar ve bölgede düzenli olarak artan Rus 
varlığı bu fırsatın gerçekleşmesini engelledi. Rusya Kafkasya’da baskın bir görünüm 
kurmayı başardı. 
Bu çalışma, Rusya’nın Kafkasya politikasının jeopolitik temelli olduğunu iddia 
etmektedir. Rusya, kendi güvenliğini sağlamak ve uluslararası arenada büyük güç 
statüsünü tekrar inşa etmek için  Kafkasya’nın kendi etki sahası içinde kalmasına özen 
göstermektedir. Rusya’nın bölgedeki amaçları sıklıkla diğer dış oyuncular tarafından 
engellenmektedir. Rusya bölgedeki hegemon pozisyonu devam ettirmek için diğer 
güçlerle mücadele etmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Jeopolitik, Rusya politikası, Kafkasya, Enerji   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The Caucasus is located between Europe and Asia. It is surrounded by Russia, Iran 
and Turkey. The Caucasus Mountains divide the region into two parts as North and 
South. The North Caucasus republics are Adygea, Karachevo-Cherkassia, Kabardino-
Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. These republics are within 
the Russian Federation. The South Caucasus republics are Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan.   
The Caucasus had been under Russian rule from 19
th
 century to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus states declared 
their independence. The Russian Federation, the successor of the Soviet Union, retained 
its sovereignty over the North Caucasus although separatist tendencies have also been 
strong in the region. 
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The Caucasus area where three main regional players meet: Russia, Iran and Turkey. 
Besides these powers, the break-up of the Soviet Union has enabled Western 
involvement in the region. The European Union and the USA also emerged as actors of 
the region. Moreover, the ambitions of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Armenia increased the 
number of players in a very small space. Among all the regions of the world, the 
Caucasus is among the most potentially explosive (Friedman, 2010).  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a critical moment for the Caucasus. The 
South Caucasus states have become sovereign states whereas the North Caucasus 
remained under the control of the Russian Federation. During and after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, violence in the North Caucasus has increased. Chechen 
separatism gained power; ethnic clashes among groups in the North Caucasus have 
become frequent. The South Caucasus also experienced substantial disorder. Interstate 
and intrastate wars affected the region’s stability. The entire region has become center of 
illegal drug trade, human trafficking, transnational crime and terrorism (Yalowitz and 
Cornell, 2004).  
Another factor that increases the importance of the Caucasus is its energy resources 
and a linkage between landlocked Caspian Sea resources to international markets. This 
role has boosted with Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (German, 2008). The construction 
of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is openly against Russian interest since it challenges 
Russian monopoly over energy routes towards the West by lessening the viability of 
Russian energy card as political leverage against Europe. This notion intensifies the 
competition in the Caucasus. 
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Despite the endeavors of other powers, Russia retains its influence over the region. 
In order to protect its interests it does not hesitate to enter into an open conflict in the 
area. 2008 Russia-Georgia War was good example of this point. Just after the war, 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that Russia regards this area as its ‘zone of 
privileged interests’ (Kuchins, 2013: 15). Russian forces engaged in two bloody wars in 
Chechnya in 1994 and 1999 respectively in the North Caucasus. It still tries to hold on in 
the North Caucasus in which religious and ethnic violence continues. In addition to 
military engagement Russia diverts economic sources from the federal budget to the 
North Caucasus. Although the North Caucasus costs Russia economically and militarily, 
Russian endeavors to keep the North Caucasus as a part of Russia continues. 
 
 
1. 1. Research Question 
 
In analyzing Russian policy towards the Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, this thesis will answer the following question: 
Why does Russia try to hold on in the North Caucasus, which burdens its economy 
and military sources and try to expand its influence and control to the South Caucasus? 
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1. 2. Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that if the Russian state concerns about the security of 
the southern border and the control over the energy routes, then the Caucasus has vital 
importance for the existence and strength of the Russian state. The Caucasus serves as a 
buffer zone that separates Russia from other regional powers. Thus, it secures Russia’s 
southern border. By retaining its control over the Caucasus Russia tries to establish 
dominance over the energy supply routes to Europe. This monopoly over the energy 
supply routes enables Russia to hold political leverage against Europe. Therefore, 
geopolitical considerations shape Russia’s Caucasus policy.  
 
 
1. 3. Theoretical Framework 
 
In addressing Russian policy towards the Caucasus this thesis uses geopolitics as a 
theoretical framework. Geopolitics focuses on geographical factors that shape states’ 
actions. It enables us to consider By analyzing geopolitical forces that shape the Russian 
attitude to the Caucasus, we can detect security vulnerabilities of the Russian Federation 
and make assessment and predictions over the conflicts and the competition over the 
energy routes in the Caucasus.  
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1. 4. Methodology  
 
This thesis is a qualitative study that attempts to explain Russian energy and security 
policies towards the Caucasus. The methodology used for this thesis will follow these 
steps: 
1- Conducting a literature review about theoretical framework, geopolitics, 
Russian foreign policy, security, military doctrines, and books, journal 
articles, and NGO reports concerning the Caucasus region. Moreover, the 
strategies of other regional powers, Iran and Turkey, and the strategies of 
outside powers, the USA and the European Union, will be presented.  
2- Making connections between geopolitical framework with Russian security 
and energy policies towards the Caucasus by locating strategies and events 
into the map of the Caucasus. 
3- The implications of the Russian policies towards the Caucasus will be 
analyzed in light of geopolitics. 
Within this context this study consists of eight chapters. In Chapter 2, I will try to 
examine geopolitical tradition. I will respectively explore the historical trace of 
geopolitical thought and how Russian geopolitics has been developed. In Chapter 3, I 
will analyze how geopolitical thought has been reflected in Russian foreign policy 
documents. Russian foreign policy documents guide Russian policy makers for 
especially their conducts in former Soviet space. In Chapter 4, I will introduce the 
geopolitics of the Caucasus region. This part reveals why Russia gives special 
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importance to this region. In Chapter 5, I will examine Russia’s South Caucasus policy. 
Russia’s bilateral relations with three South Caucasus republics will be analyzed. In 
Chapter 6, I will examine Russia’s North Caucasus policy. In this chapter, I will analyze 
how Russia responds to ongoing insurgency in the region. In Chapter 7, I will present 
Russia’s energy policy and its place in Russian foreign policy goals. I will analyze the 
importance of the Caucasus in Russia’s energy policy. In Chapter 8, I will present the 
attempts of other regional and global powers to influence the developments of the 
Caucasus. By presenting the aims of Russia’s competitors in the Caucasus region, the 
significance of the Caucasus for Russia will be better understood. In Chapter 9, I will 
draw upon conclusions of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
GEOPOLITICS 
 
 
 
In 1755, an earthquake devastated Lisbon causing the deaths of thousands of people. 
Voltaire, who is a famous French philosopher, protested the earthquake because it was 
against reason and intellect. According to Voltaire the earthquake was scandalous 
dereliction of the nature that destroyed the capital of Portugal (Kaplan, 2013). Voltaire’s 
protest may sound absurd but this statement reflects denouncement against constrains of 
geography upon the nation’s fate which contradict the idea that the endeavors of human 
agency determine the fate of nations.  
Personal and national economic health, prosperity and security are greatly affected 
by geography. For instance, geography determines which states possess natural 
resources and which states do not. When the states that possess natural resources raise 
natural gas and oil resources, other states will pay higher prices (Chapman, 2011). This 
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gives the political benefit to a nation which possesses natural resources.  Nevertheless, to 
acknowledge geography’s role is not to accept humankind is powerless. Kaplan argues 
that geography serves to qualify human choice with a modest acceptance of fate. 
Geography must be conceived as first order of reality whereas ideas as second order. 
Man will initiate but nature will control. Denying the facts of geography only invites 
disasters which will make states victims of geography (Kaplan, 2009). Human agency 
might have a role in international setting by acknowledging the opportunities or 
disadvantages presented by geography.  
The term geopolitics was coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen. 
Geopolitics is defined in Kejellen’s works as “the science which deals with the influence 
of geographic factors on the creation and existence of the states” (Haggman, 1998: 108). 
Kjellen developed other systems of analysis such as Demopolitik, Economopolitik, 
Sociopolitik, and Cratopolitik. These systems of analysis form the cultural side of the 
state. Geopolitik forms the objective foundation of the state in which subjective 
creativity of the executive is able to act (Tunander, 2008). The state is a living organism 
which is able to expand its influence in accordance with geopolitical concerns 
(Costachie, 2011). Kjellen conceives state borders as permeable which can change.  
Friedrich Ratzel, who was a German geographer, used the term of Lebensraum to 
describe a specific amount of territory where the state draws sustenance. He advocates 
that when a state’s Lebensraum becomes insufficient, the state needs to expand its 
territories (Jones et al., 2004). Geopolitical understanding must guide economic and 
cultural developments in the state to move the state in a more advantageous spatial space 
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(Costachie, 2011). Ratzel’s writings had been influential on political life and provided 
intellectual justification for the German expansionism.  
Kjellen and Ratzel’s works laid the foundations of geopolitics. The major debate in 
geopolitics is centered on the works of Mackinder’s heartland theory and Mahan’s sea 
power theory. In Mackinder’s theory, the Heartland of the world serves as a pivot area 
for the control of the World Island which is composed of Europe, Asia and Africa. The 
Heartland area includes the Volga and Ural basin; the Lena, Yenisei and Obi rivers 
towards the northern Asia. The area also coincides with Baltic and Black Sea, Asia 
Minor, Tibet and Mongolia (Mackinder, 1942). He claims that throughout the history 
Europe had to deal with invasion attempts of the civilizations from the Heartland and 
that indicates the significance of the Heartland. Eastern Europe served as a linkage for 
these invasions (Mackinder, 1904). The history of Europe was shaped according to 
geopolitical imperatives. The Union of Franks, Goths, and Roman provincials against 
the invaders that came from the Heartland created the basis for modern France (Kaplan, 
2009). Mackinder formulizes that: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World Island 
commands the world” (Mackinder, 1942: 106).   
Mackinder’s theory had predicted the rise of the Soviet Union as a great power. Most 
of pivot area was controlled by the Soviet Union after the Second World War. By 
establishing COMECON the Soviet Union had included Eastern Europe in its sphere of 
influence. Therefore, it was able to exert pressure over Europe. The control of the 
Caucasus offered the Soviet Union to reach to the Middle East. Now, Russia tries to 
consolidate its power on the same areas that once the Soviet Union had possessed.  
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On the other hand, Alfred Mahan articulates the importance of controlling the seas. 
He suggests that establishing control over seas is necessary condition to become a 
hegemon. The historical rise of Rome and Britain are examples of this premise. The 
geographical position gives some littoral states advantage in defending their costs and 
controlling the seas. For instance, England is placed more advantageous compared to 
France and Holland because its aim is directed upon the sea whereas the boundaries of 
Holland and France are continental. He suggested not only building a strong navy but 
also controlling naval checkpoints throughout the world for harboring and repairing the 
ships (Mahan, 1918). Maritime shipping, a strong navy, and benefits of seaborne 
commerce would give naval powers a great advantage over nations whose capabilities 
are bound mainly to the land (Dueck, 2013). 
Mahan’s views had an effect on the restoration of the US navy and US expansion on 
overseas. Secretary of State John Hay, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore 
Roosevelt read the book and asserted that the USA should abandon its post-Civil War 
isolationism. These individuals argued that the USA should increase its agriculture and 
industrial exports to overseas markets. In order to secure global merchant and naval 
shipping a strong navy must be built (Chapman, 2011).  
Mahan’s thesis concerning control of sea exerted great deal of influence on US 
geopolitical thinking. US navy dominance allows the USA to project its power 
throughout the world. Control over world’s oceans is cornerstone of U.S. geopolitical 
security. As the global naval power, the USA exercises a decisive influence over the 
principal avenue of both international trade and the world’s energy supply security 
(U.S.: Naval Dominance and the Importance of Oceans, 2008).  
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Nicholas Spykman compares and evaluates the ideas of Mahan’s sea power theory 
and Mackinder’s the Heartland theory. He adds that setting control over air will be 
important in controlling transportation and communication (Spykman, 1970). 
Spykman’s theory concerning the Heartland differs from Mackinder’s theory in terms of 
the territories included into the Heartland. Spykman asserts that the Rimland comprised 
of European and Asian coasts encircles the Heartland. The control of the Heartland is 
related with the control of the Rimland. He makes practical policy suggestion in 
controlling the Heartland, which mostly corresponds the territories of the Soviet Union, 
the control over the Rimland is important. (Spykman, 1970). Spykman was convinced 
that the Heartland was open to cultural and civilizational impulses coming from the 
Rimland He reworked Mackinder’s formula as: Who controls the Rimland controls 
Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world (Petersen, 2011).   
Spykman’s study is significant because it laid the intellectual foundation of George 
Kennan’s containment strategy during the Cold War. In 1942, Spykman advocated the 
creation of a common defense organization to secure the Rimland from the Soviet 
aggression. He suggested that the Soviet Union would be restrained on the flanks 
(Blouet, 2005). The Soviet Union, an expansionist heartland power, needed to be 
contained to prevent it from reaching the maritime-oriented Rimland. The defense of 
Western Europe, Israel, the Shah’s Iran, and the wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam was 
carried out to prevent a communist empire from extending control from the Heartland to 
the Rimland (Kaplan, 2012).   
The Cold War ended with the victory of a sea power over a land power. Although 
Mackinder backed the wrong side in the battle, he fundamentally understood the nature 
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of the continued struggle. Colin Gray noted that: “From a geographical perspective the 
twentieth century with the First and Second Wars and the Cold War, was a struggle to 
prevent Mackinder’s predictions” (Petersen, 2011: 35). Policy of encirclement was 
implemented to contain the Heartland power which was the Soviet Union. This constant 
struggle continued after the Cold War. Keeping Eurasia is divided and restricted is an 
important element of US strategy in the prevention of the emergence of a potential 
challenger to the United States (U.S.: Naval Dominance and the Importance of Oceans, 
2008). In his famous book The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski contends that Eurasia 
continues to be a chessboard on which the struggle for global supremacy continues to be 
played and that struggle contains the strategic management of geopolitical interests. To 
achieve this goal he advocates strong U.S. engagement into the Central Asia and the 
Caucasus (Brzezinski, 1998).  
Geopolitics remained relevant in international relations after the end of the Cold 
War. State’s policies are still guided by geopolitical concerns. For instance, according to 
Michael Klare, the purpose of the war in Iraq is to redraw the geopolitical map of 
Eurasia to prevent the rise of potential competitors of the USA such as Russia, China, 
and the European Union. He argues that the new center of competition is south-central 
Eurasia which encompasses the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian Sea basin, and the 
surrounding countries of the Central Asia (Foster, 2006). Brzezinski (1998) still views 
the world as a global chessboard where states compete for gaining advantageous 
positions. He urges the US leaders to take measures to prevent the emergence of one 
dominant power in Eurasia. Competition over different regions and spaces suggests that 
geopolitics will continue to be a valuable theory to understand world events.  
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2. 1. Russian Geopolitics 
 
The main factor that drives Russian geopolitics understanding is Russia’s 
indefensibility. The core of Russia lacks the natural borders that prevent invasions. The 
lack of natural boundaries had important consequences. When Russia was weak, nature 
offered it little protection; but when it grew strong, there were few geopolitical barriers 
to stop it from projecting its power (Trenin, 2002). In Russian history, the invasions 
have come from two main directions. The first is from steppes- wide open grasslands 
that connect Russia to Central Asia- which Mongols had used. The second is from the 
North European Plain, which brought Teutonic Knights and Nazis (Friedman, 2008a).  
Due to the absence of natural barriers of protection, it made strategic sense to Russia 
to win space to meet the enemy as far as from the core territory as possible. Since the 
15
th
 century this strengthening the borders became an axiom to deny territory to a 
potential adversary (Trenin, 2002). Russia expanded towards the Eastern Europe, the 
Caucasus and the Central Asia. The tsars of the Russian Empire followed the 
imperatives of geography to secure the tsardom. Russia expanded to secure its borders 
against invasions Friedman (2008a) shows the phases of the Russian expansion: 
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Figure 1: Russian Expansion Phases 
 
 
The Tsarist’s policy of expansion was followed by the Soviet Union although the use 
of the term of geopolitics was avoided. Geopolitics was demonized during the days of 
the Soviet Union for allegedly promoting militarism and chauvinism among the masses 
(Erickson, 1999). Although geopolitics’ concerns were not explicitly stated, the Soviet 
Union tried to expand and maintain its control over Eurasia (Kerr, 1995). This policy 
attitude could be seen as a continuation of the effect of geopolitics. Like the tsarist 
empire, the Soviet Union formed several defensive rings. The Soviet Union itself was 
secure due to these defensive rings. The inner ring consisted of friendly regimes in 
Eastern and Central Europe: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The 
Brezhnev Doctrine clearly stated that Communist regimes were irreversible, and 
demonstrated that Czechoslovakia in 1968. The outer ring of socialist countries, 
extending to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America allowed for some ebbs and 
15 
 
flows (Trenin, 2002). However, in long term, this Soviet design required enormous 
sources, which ultimately made it unsustainable. It eventually brought the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union created geopolitical confusion. Several questions 
have emerged concerning Russian position in the world as a result of new geographical 
realities. Discussion over this issue contains geopolitical content (Brzezinski, 1998). 
There are several schools of thought that are important in assessing the influence of 
geopolitics on current Russian foreign policy decision making. These schools of thought 
are Atlanticism, Eurasianism and pragmatic geopolitical model (Isakova, 2005).  
Atlanticism in Russian geopolitical context is associated with the desire to establish 
warm relations with the Western world. It conceives Russia not only as legal successor 
to the Soviet Union but also part of the global world. Euro-Atlanticists advocated 
cooperation with West and adoption of Western institutions. Famous Euro-Atlanticists 
former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev during Yeltsin’s presidency states that: “The 
country’s greatness…is determined not by the scale of its empire but above all by the 
level of its people’s well-being” (Cornell, 2001: 326).  Enhancement of people’s well-
being was thought to be achieved by becoming a partner of the Western world. 
Brzezinski (1998) claims that the problem with this approach is that Atlanticism is 
devoid of international or domestic realism. Russia was too weak and backward to be a 
real global partner. Once differences started to surface, the disproportion in political 
power, financial clout, and cultural appeal made this partnership seem hollow.   
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The dominance of Euro-Atlanticists over Russian foreign policy has been eroded due 
to the belief that the costs of pro-Western policy exceeded its benefits and the linkage 
between rapid privatization and pro-Western foreign policy. Eurasianists became 
dominant in Russian foreign policy making (Kerr, 1995). Eurasianism asserts that Russia 
is the self-proclaimed leading Eurasian state, a special role within post-Soviet space. 
That Russia’s Eurasian spetsifika became a common reference for Russian policy 
makers who represent Eurasian lobby (Morozova, 2009). Eurasianism, however, is not 
homogenous. Three main groups represent Eurasian thought: New Right, Eurasian 
Communists and Democratic Statists (G. Smith, 1999). 
The prominent figures of New Right Eurasianists are Alexandr Prokhonov and 
Alexandr Dugin. New Right group emphasize the distinctive civilizational aspect of the 
Russian Federation (G. Smith, 1999). Dugin is influenced by Mackinder’s land 
domination theory with a cultural element. In order to become advantageous in the 
geopolitical struggle, Russia should assert its dominance over the Heartland (Dugin, 
1999). Dugin emphasizes cultural aspect of domination in which the most important 
element is Orthodoxy. According to Dugin, this metaphysical dimension and Eurasian 
geopolitics merge and become indistinguishable in the sovereign presence of Russia 
(Morozova, 2009). Leonid Ivashov, the vice-president of the Academy of Geopolitical 
Problems argues that Russia is capable of becoming a leader of the world if Russia 
occupies the central part of the Eurasian continent. He suggests that Russia should seek 
allies who share the values of distinct Eurasian civilization (M. Smith, 2005). New Right 
Eurasianist’s evaluations are much more value based rather than objective geopolitical 
analysis. They represent a strong reaction towards rapid Westernization. 
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The communist wing of Eurasian thought is represented by Gennady Zyuganov, who 
is also the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. His geopolitical 
thought is based on reestablishment of communist Eurasia in order to be a world power 
(G. Smith, 1999). His theory differs from New Right thinkers in that he also suggests 
return to communism. Zygunov’s perceptions, therefore, appear to have less practical 
implications. 
Democratic statists argue that Russia has distinctive interests and civilization but this 
situation does not automatically prompt an anti-Western state. Russia is a Eurasian 
power whose role is to organize and stabilize the Eurasian heartland but it also has to 
work with the West. It should operate a bridge between Europe and Asia (G. Smith, 
1999).   
Isakova’s conceptualization of pragmatic geopolitical model resembles with Smith’s 
description of democratic statism within Eurasianism. Pragmatic geopolitical model 
asserts that the unique geo-strategic place of the state provides conditions for its 
economic revival, opportunities for engaging in the regional institutions. Russia’s role as 
a bridge state between Europe and Asia is emphasized. This approach also contends that 
Russia has economic, military and political privileges in the former Soviet Union 
countries (Isakova, 2005).  
The pragmatic Eurasianism is much more connected to the reality. It is no longer so 
much concerned with the development of a Slavic identity but focused on Russia’s 
autonomous development in partnership with the West but reasserting its great power 
status (Sakwa, 2008). This approach lacks ideational aspiration but it has practical 
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considerations. Some of these considerations contain economic efficiency, efficient use 
of the geopolitical resources inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union, extended 
geopolitics (forward presence, Russian military bases abroad), pragmatism, and 
maximum use of geo-economic privileges (Isakova, 2005). Bugajski, however, cynically 
call this approach as pragmatic reimperialization. According to Bugajski, pragmatic 
imperialism is a useful way to describe Putinist Russia’s foreign policy employed to 
realize specific national ambitions (Bugajski, 2010). However, Russia’s expansion, 
blamed for having imperialist tendencies, is necessitated by geopolitical concerns. The 
most concentrated assessment of the current Russian understanding of geopolitics 
probably was summarized by Dmitri Rogozin, ex-chairman of the State Duma III 
Committee of Foreign Relations: 
It is high time to understand that Russia does not have friends; there are only 
interests. It is high time to understand there is no place in politics for naïve emotions. 
Our own people should be loved, and the same right should be given to our 
neighbors. But it is not permissible to love your neighbor’s cat more than your child. 
We live in a tough world and in though surroundings. All our actions should be 
determined by the policy of rational national egoism (Isakova, 2005: 19). 
In order to reassert the great power status in the eyes of the Western world Russia 
must have some kind of leverage against Europe. The reassertion of Russian power on 
former-Soviet space will provide resources to be considered as an equal power with 
Europe. Thus, Russia will be able to project its power. Moreover, as argued in the 
beginning of the section, Russia’s defining problem is its indefensibility. Russia needs 
buffer zones in order to protect its borders.  
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The Near Abroad policy proposed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union responds 
to this necessity without affirming to reestablish the Soviet Union. In Brzezinski’s 
words, “the ‘near abroad’ came to be shorthand formulation for advocacy of a policy 
that would place primary emphasis on the need to reconstruct some sort of a viable 
framework, with Moscow as the decision-making center, in the geopolitical space once 
occupied by the Soviet Union” (Brzezinski, 1998: 55). This policy attributes a special 
position to Russia over former-Soviet space. Therefore, it is also a geopolitical project 
seeks to prevent the other actors from undermining Russian position in this defined 
zone. Nevertheless, it should not be confused with extreme Eurasianism which assumes 
the reestablishment of the Soviet Union. The Near Abroad policy suggests maintaining 
Russian control over former Soviet Union without changing borders.  
Brzezinski (1998) claims that Russia lacks will and attraction to impose its power 
over post-Soviet space. Thus, Russia should abandon this desire and join into European 
community. This evaluation is based on the circumstances of the 1990s when Russian 
economy has collapsed. Russian desire to dominate former-Soviet space is no longer 
merely a fantasy. It has shaped the minds of Russian policy-makers because of the 
disillusionment from Atlanticist policies pursued intensively especially in the first years 
of Yeltsin era. The official documents in foreign policy field reflect emphasis on 
Russia’s special role in Eurasia. These foreign policy documents, security and military 
doctrines contend that Russia will not concede other parties’ involvement in the region 
which it draws as Russian zone of influence.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT, MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DOCTRINES 
 
 
 
3. 1. Foreign Policy Concept 
 
The Russian foreign policy concept is a system of views on the content and main 
areas in the foreign policy activities of Russia (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the 
Russian Federation, 2013). Russian policymakers and leaders focus on two fundamental 
aims in foreign policy: Russia’s desire to increase its global influence and to see it 
economic growth continue. (Oliker et al., 2009). The collapse of the Soviet Union forced 
Russia to answer series of fundamental questions about its relationship to the post-Cold 
War world system and its own identity as a state. In the early 1990s, Yeltsin presided 
over a country that appeared to be joining its Cold War enemies in a new, democratic 
West. By the middle of decade, however, this idea had been replaced by a determination 
21 
 
to restore Russia as an independent international actor. In 2000s, Vladimir Putin pursued 
a desire to set Russia as a great power in international affairs (Mankoff, 2009).  
The current foreign concept of the Russian Federation was approved by the President 
Putin on 12 February 2013, replacing 2008 foreign policy concept. It consists of five 
main sections: general provisions, foreign policy of the Russian Federation and modern 
world, priorities for the Russian Federation to face global issues, regional priorities, 
development and implementation of foreign policy of the Russian Federation. This 
document contains of a systematic description of Russian foreign policy, Russian aims 
and priorities. Foreign policy concepts reflect the desire of upgrading Russia’s status in 
order to establish a multi-dimensional and balanced world order. The document 
supposes a multipolar environment in international affairs. It emphasizes that positions 
of Eurasia and Asia-Pacific regions must have equal standing with Europe in preserving 
stability in the world (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013). 
Russia views, thus, international setting as regional groupings in which Eurasia emerges 
as significant power center as Europe.  
Russia considers itself as the main power which is responsible for building 
cooperation and integration in the post-Soviet space. Russia sees as a priority task of 
establishing the Eurasian Economic Union aiming not only to make the best use of 
mutually beneficial economic ties in the CIS space but also to become a model for other 
states. Russia tries to promote the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). The task of transforming the CSTO into an organization capable of 
counteracting current challenges and threats is relevant. The document also emphasizes 
the deep-rooted civilizational ties with Eurasian states and Russia. Russia will give its 
22 
 
priority to this region while preserving friendly relations with the European Union and 
the United States (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013). 
Russia engages in several projects to accomplish integration with the countries which 
exist in the post-Soviet space. This notion of the document is coincided with near abroad 
policy.  
Although Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation received little 
substantial attention in the West because it is perceived as simply bureaucratic 
formulation, it offers important insight into how Russia views the international 
environment and how Russia will act according to that environment (Monaghan, 2013). 
Russia declares that Russia has specific interests and privileges over the post-Soviet 
space. These interest and privileges entails Russia to initiate economic and political 
projects in order to bring the countries in the post-Soviet space under Russian umbrella 
in economic, security and political areas. Security and military doctrines issued by the 
Russian Federation, therefore, articulate similar points that foreign policy concept does. 
These documents are in conformity with foreign policy concept.   
 
 
3. 2. Military Doctrines of the Russian Federation 
 
Although often vague and theoretical, Russian military doctrine reflects the ideas 
and attitudes of the interested parties within the state concerning military policy. It is a 
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useful insight into threat perception and policy choices (Brannon, 2009). The first 
military doctrine of the Russian Federation was promulgated in November 1993. The 
internal struggles within Russian domestic politics delayed the promulgation of the 
doctrine until 1993. The desires of becoming role model for CIS countries, to provide 
guidance for the army and to make the army compatible with the regime were the main 
motivations behind the doctrine. (Kipp, 2011).  
1993 Military Doctrine tries to reach a consensus between Atlanticist approach and 
Eurasianist approach. 1993 Military Doctrine states that the Russian Federation’s 
military security and its interests depend on resolving economic, political and social 
problems in the domestic sphere by implementing reforms and developing close 
relations with its neighbors and the leading powers in the world in foreign policy. 
Russian Federation is committed to the principle of resolving conflicts in peaceful ways 
and regards no state as enemy (The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation, 1993).  
On the other hand, in the document, the principle threats were identified as the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the territories contiguous to the borders 
(The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 1993). 
Military operations in Chechnya and Russian presence in the former Soviet republics 
were justified with these clauses (Brannon, 2009). The Russian Federation bears the 
responsibility for the material supply, technical support, training, planning, and 
operational command of the CIS countries (The Basic Provisions of the Military 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 1993). 
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Military doctrine promulgated in 2000 emphasized the internal threats that the 
Russian Federation encounters. The threat posed by ethnic groups, religious extremists 
and local tribes was emphasized (Russia's Military Doctrine 2000, 2000).  Brannon 
(2009) claims that the most important innovation was the broadening of conflict 
scenarios under which nuclear weapons could be used.  Besides global wars, stated in 
1993 doctrine, regional wars are included as the wars under which nuclear weapons 
could be used. This view signaled that major foreign interference in the ‘antiterrorism 
operation’ could precipitate the use of nuclear weapons. In this aspect, 2000 Military 
Doctrine is more assertive than 1993 Military Doctrine concerning Russia’s response to 
foreign intervention into its perceived sphere of influence.  
The latest military doctrine was prepared during Medvedev’s presidency term in 
2010. In this doctrine, Russian security thinking presents a mixed view. It states that 
political and military threats are reduced. On the other hand, in some areas military 
conflicts and threats are intensified (M. d. Haas, 2011). NATO’s activities in the areas 
which are close to Russia, the spread of international terrorism and the activities of 
international jihadist groups in areas adjacent to the Russian Federation are considered 
main external threats. Attempts to change the constitutional structure of the state the 
undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the 
activities of illegal armed groups in the Russian Federation are considered as main 
internal threats. To respond these threats the CSTO’s role is highlighted in the 
document. Russia will contribute to the CSTO in deterring and preventing armed 
conflict. (Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, 2010).  
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2010 Military Doctrine considers NATO’s activities in the countries which are 
contiguous to Russian borders as external threat. NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet 
space means the loss of buffer zone for Russia. Eastern Europe and Baltic countries have 
already joined into NATO. NATO has been approaching Russia step by step. From the 
perspective of Moscow, Western countries seek to restrict Russia within its own 
boundaries. Thus, Russia’s power and influence would be small (Ghaedi et al., 2012). 
That doctrine reveals Russia will anticipate NATO expansion in the post-Soviet states as 
a national threat. 
 
 
3. 3. Security Doctrines of the Russian Federation 
 
Security Doctrines of the Russian Federation offers insight about the existing 
Russian strategies concerning security issues, Russian threat perceptions and suggestions 
to counter the threats. Russia’s national security conception embraces not only the 
military defense per se, but also economics and the defense of Russia’s cultural and 
moral spiritual heritage and traditions (Tennenbaum, 2000).  
1997 National Security Concept was intended to orient Russian policy makers for 
the post-Cold War period. It outlined Russian national interests, external and internal 
threats and established a set of foreign and domestic policy goals to strengthen Russia’s 
statehood and geopolitical position (Brannon, 2009). The document advocates forming a 
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voluntarily integrated entity of CIS member states. Defending the rights, liberties and 
dignity of the Russians who live in other countries is listed as a foreign policy priority of 
the Russian Federation.  It mentions NATO’s desire of expansion as an external threat 
(Godzimirsk, 2000).  
2000 National Security Concept focuses on the link between economic development 
and national security. In order to strengthen the state’s security, the economic 
development is vital. Therefore, the document emphasizes that the state would regulate 
and control financial and credit system. The state will also control strategically key 
economic institutions. (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000). 
Organization of economy was perceived as necessary to build Russia’s state power. 
Tennenbaum (2000) argues that 2000 National Security Concept should be seen as an 
overriding institutional response to existential threat posed by the combination of 
economic collapse and geopolitical understanding coming from British-American 
commonwealth coming from the West. 
2000 National Security Concept argued that despite its many problems, Russia 
remained one of the strongest countries in the world. It insisted that Russia still had the 
potential to play a leading role in international security (Brannon, 2009). The document 
states that ignoring Russia’s interest would undermine international security, stability, 
and the positive changes achieved in international relations (Godzimirsk, 2000).  
 Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020 was endorsed in 2009 by decree of the 
president of the Russian Federation, Dmitri Medvedev. According to, Medvedev, the 
National Security Strategy is “a fundamental, system forming document, which is aimed 
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at the enhancement of the quality of the state control" (Gilles, 2009: 3). In this 
document, it is stated that in the long term, the attention of international politics will be 
focused on ownership of energy resources, including Near East, the Barents Sea, the 
Arctic, in the Caspian Basin, and the Central Asia. In the medium term, the conflicts in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Africa and the Middle East will exert a negative 
influence on the international situation (The national security of the Russian Federation 
until 2020, 2009).  
The development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Commonwealth 
of Independent States is considered as a priority direction of Russian foreign policy. 
Russia aims at strengthening ties between CIS states and developing integration among 
these states. The CSTO is regarded as the main instrument for responding to regional 
threats and challenges. Russia also wants to develop its relations with the European 
Union. However, the relationship between NATO and Russia will depend on the 
expansion plans of NATO in countries close to the borders of Russia (The national 
security of the Russian Federation until 2020, 2009).  
The Security Doctrines reveal Russian aspirations in the international setting. 
Russian policy makers declare that they oppose any intervention and expansion in the 
areas which Russia considers its sphere of influence. Economy, politics and military are 
thought coherently to provide Russia’s security. The Security Doctrines, thus, reflect the 
consensus among the state institutions of the Russian Federation concerning Russia’s 
position in the world.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CAUCASUS 
 
 
 
4. 1. Geographical Position of the Caucasus 
 
The Caucasus is a largely mountainous region between the Caspian Sea and Black 
Sea. Running from the west- northwest to the east- southeast are two parallel mountain 
chains: the Greater (Northern) Caucasus and the lesser (Southern) Caucasus (The 
Meaning of Place: The Caucasus Flashpoint, 2012). The Caucasus is the bridge between 
Asia and Europe that comprises an area of 440, 194 km
2. 
The northern part is known as 
the North Caucasus, but is called Ciscaucasia in Russian literature. It comprises the 
Russian part of the Caucasus except for the Black Sea coastline. The South Caucasus, 
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also known Transcaucasus, encompasses the territory of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and the Black Sea coastline of the Russian Federation (Coene, 2010).  
The main chain of the Caucasus Mountains extends from the Taman Peninsula on 
the Black Sea to the Absheron Peninsula on the Caspian Sea. The mountains form a 
series of high parallel ridges. In the west the mountains rise as low, wooded hills. In the 
center of range they become granite edifices. In the east they split into two different 
chains and flatten out, continuing as a mass of high tablelands cut by deep gorges (King, 
2008). The Greater Caucasus forms a genuine barrier for outside influence. Although the 
main Caucasus range is difficult to cross, it does not preclude the many commonalities 
in the economic and socio-cultural aspects on either side. These mountains can be 
crossed via several passes. The most important ones are the Mamison Pass (Ossetian 
Military Road), Roki Pass and the Daryal Pass (Georgian Military Road) (Coene, 2010). 
The existence of these passes increased the significance of the Russian-Georgian border. 
Geographical conditions have affected the settlements in the Caucasus. The High 
Caucasus possesses a double asymmetry. The steep southern slope plunges directly into 
the Black Sea. By contrast, the ascent from steppe through piedmont to mountains is 
gradual on the northern slope, with series of mountains spread out largely in Dagestan. 
There agriculture is possible between 1,500 meters and 2,000 meters in alternating 
ridges and valleys. On the other hand, vertical slopes made valleys isolated and highly 
inaccessible. This highly variegated landscape determines the relative isolation of ethno-
cultural groups and their settlements (O’Loughlin et al., 2007). These geographical 
conditions resulted in a multitude of ethnic groups tucked away in western fastnessness, 
like the Abkhazians and Ossetians stubbornly resist Georgian rule. In the eastern tunnel, 
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there is only one area where a deep cut into the South Caucasus by a river: at the 
mountain enclave known as Nagorno-Karabakh, home of Karabakh Armenians, who 
have proven to be resistant to Azerbaijan’s control (The Meaning of Place: The 
Caucasus Flashpoint, 2012). 
Environmental conditions and geographical qualities contributed to the creation of 
different socio-economic and cultural life in the different parts of the Caucasus. King 
comments that: “The Caucasus has never been one place but many, including arid plains, 
semitropical foothills, craggy gorges, and alpine peaks. Moving through these varied 
landscapes- crossing rivers or coming down out of the hills- literally meant exiting one 
world and entering another” (King, 2008: 8). North of the Caucasus the terrain quickly 
widens, flattens and dries becoming the Eurasian steppe which is the home of the 
Russians. South of the South Caucasus is not as nearly steep or stark as the North 
Caucasus and it merges with the rugged highlands of the Anatolian Plateau in the west, 
the Zagros Mountains in the south and Iran’s Elburz Mountains which is the domain of 
the Persians in the east (The Meaning of Place: The Caucasus Flashpoint, 2012).  
 
Figure 2: Outside Influence on the Caucasus 
 
(The Meaning of Place: The Caucasus Flashpoint, 2012). 
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The map presented suggests that Iran has more advantageous in penetrating into 
Azerbaijan and Armenia perplexing Russian fears of the intervention of outside powers 
into the Caucasus. Narrow coastal strip and mountains hinder Russian and Turkish 
endeavors to reach to the South Caucasus. Moreover, lack of infrastructure conditions 
also complicates Russian expedition to the South Caucasus. There are no railroads from 
the North Caucasus to South Caucasus. The only roads proper are often closed due to 
heavy snow and rainstorms (O’Loughlin et al., 2007). Throughout the history the South 
Caucasus has experienced more and stronger foreign trade and influence form the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean than from the North Caucasus (Coene, 2010).  Iran 
could not exploit its geographical advantages since it is occupied with the developments 
in the Gulf of Persia but the potential still remains for Iran to influence the Caucasus 
region. Turkey’s eastward accession is hindered by high mountains that exist in Eastern 
Anatolia. Coastal line of Georgia on the Black Sea is so narrow that it does not give 
additional advantage to Turkey to use it.  
 
 
4. 2. Ethnic Composition of the Caucasus 
 
The ethnic structure of the Caucasus is complex and dynamic. There are dozens of 
national and ethnic groups that exist in the Caucasus. In the North Caucasus, the main 
national and ethnic groups are Russians, Chechens, Circassians, Dargins, Ingush, 
Kabardins, Karachays, Kumyks, Laks, Lezgins, Nogays, Ossetians, Tats and Shapsugs. 
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Only in Dagestan, there are approximately 30 different ethnic groups (The North 
Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Ethnicity and Conflict, 2012).  In the South 
Caucasus, the main ethnic and national groups are Ossetians, Abkhazians, Georgians, 
Mingrelians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis (O’Loughlin et al., 2007). The most 
complicating factor is borders of the states and political areas do not coincide with 
ethnic composition. This situation exacerbates ethnic conflicts.  
 
Figure 3: Ethnic Composition of the Caucasus 
 
(O’Loughlin et al.,  2007). 
 
There are geographical and political reasons for this complicated ethnic picture that 
exist in the Caucasus. Geographically, people preferred to settle in in the plains and the 
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piedmonts instead of living in harsh conditions in the mountains. The lands which are 
more suitable for living attracted different ethnic groups. Therefore, population 
composed of various ethnic groups concentrated in small areas (Coene, 2010).   
Another reason was the Soviet engineering via administrative measures. Significant 
changes in ethnic composition of the Caucasus resulted from the Stalinist deportations of 
the 1940s. On February 23, 1944, 478.000 Chechens and Ingush were deported to the 
Northern Kazakhstan. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was abolished; its 
territories were divided between Georgia, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 
and the newly created Grozny Oblast. In 1956, the deportees were rehabilitated and 
allowed to return their lands but their lands were occupied by other ethnic groups in the 
Caucasus (Zürcher, 2007). The enmity between various ethnic groups in the Caucasus, 
thus, was seeded. The status of the administrative units had been changed constantly 
until the dissolution of the Soviet Union (O’Loughlin et al., 2007). After the end of the 
Soviet Union, one of Russia’s main tools to interfere in the Caucasus’s affairs is utilizing 
ethnic conflicts that had been perpetrated by the Soviet Union.  
 
 
4. 3. Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Caucasus 
 
The oil production in the Caucasus concentrated in the South Caucasus. The region 
around Baku in Azerbaijan was the oldest oil-producing area in the Russian Empire in 
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the Soviet Union. During the Soviet period, the oil production in the Caspian basin had 
been limited. After the Second World War, the Caspian Basin never accounted for more 
than 8 percent of the Soviet oil production (Raballand and Gente, 2008). Nevertheless, 
the Caspian Sea’s oil and gas potential has attracted the attention of the international oil 
and gas industry since the late 1980s and early 1990s with the break-up of the Soviet 
Union when the investment to energy resources became possible (Effimoff, 2000). 
Promising potential concerning oil and gas resources caused the intense interest shown 
by major international oil and gas companies in the Caspian Sea. Some top officials of 
the littoral states describe the region as another Middle East, another Saudi Arabia and 
another Kuwait (Bahgat, 2002). The desire to reduce dependency on the oil reserves in 
the Middle East created great excitement and expectation in the West. Emphasizing on 
the importance of hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea Basin, US Secretary of 
Energy Bill Richardson argued: “The Caspian region will hopefully save us from total 
dependence on Middle East oil” (Kumar, 2009: 8). The Caspian Basin was considered as 
El Dorado of the oil production. 
On the other hand, proven oil reserves in the Caspian Basin turned out to have less 
than expected. There is a great disparity between the data provided by the US 
government and academic institutions. According to Bahgat (2002), this inconsistency 
reflects an orchestrated effort to exaggerate significance of the region’s hydrocarbon 
wealth. According to the report published by US government’s Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) in 1998, total oil resources of the region are estimated around 218 
billion barrels of which 32, 5 billion are already said to be proven. The states of the 
Caspian Basin also took a buoyant view concerning the reserves to attract foreign 
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investors (Kumar, 2009). However, serious studies have shown that oil reserves in the 
Caspian Basin would not be able to compete with the Middle East oil reserves. Caspian 
oil production can be classified as “important at the margin” (Raballand and Gente, 
2008: 10). The proven oil gas reserves in the Caspian Basin are shown:  
 
Table 1: Proven Oil Gas Reserves in the Caspian Basin 
 At the end 
1992 
Thousand 
million 
barrels 
 
At the end 
2002 
Thousand 
million barrels 
 
At the end 
2011 
Thousand 
million barrels 
 
At the end 
2012 
Thousand 
million barrels 
 
 
 
Share 
of Total 
Azerbaijan n/a 7.0  7.0 0.4% 
Russian Federation n/a 76.1 87.1 87.2 5.2% 
Kazakhstan n/a 5.4 30.0 30.0 1.8% 
Iran 92.9 130.7 154.6 157.0 9.4% 
Turkmenistan n/a 0.5 0.6 0.6 Less than 
0.05% 
Uzbekistan n/a 0.6 0.6 0.6 Less than 
0.05% 
 
(BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, 2013: 6). 
Natural gas has also been discovered in the Caspian Basin. The region’s relative 
contribution to world natural gas supplies is larger than oil (Emadi and Nezdah, 2011). 
Shah Deniz discovery was the major breakthroughs in gas discovery after the end of the 
Soviet Union. In 1999, BP Amoco announced that it had struck natural gas in Shah 
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Deniz that is estimated contain between 25 and 39 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) of natural gas. 
This field is being developed by international consortium which comprises companies 
from the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Russia, France, Azerbaijan and Iran 
(Bahgat, 2002). This discovery renewed the optimism concerning the potential natural 
gas resources of the region. According to the report submitted to the Congress, it is 
expected that with additional discoveries the region’s natural gas production will exceed 
Saudi Arabia’s production (Gelb, 2006). Despite this optimism, it is unlikely that the 
Caspian Basin gas production could reach to the Persian Gulf production. The proven 
gas reserves in the Caspian Basin are shown below: 
 
Table 2: Proven Natural Gas Reserves in the Caspian Basin 
 At the end 
1990 
Trillion cubic 
meters 
 
At the end 
2000 
Trillion cubic 
meters 
 
At the end 
2009 
Trillion cubic 
meters 
 
At the end 
2010 
Trillion cubic 
meters 
 
 
 
Share 
of 
Total 
Azerbaijan  n/a 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5% 
Russian Federation n/a 29.8 32.9 32.9 17.6% 
Kazakhstan n/a 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.7% 
Iran  20.7 26.7 33.6 33.6 18.0% 
Turkmenistan n/a 2.3 17.5 17.5 9.3% 
Uzbekistan n/a 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.6% 
 
(BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, 2013). 
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Oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Basin attracted interest after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The Western countries which wanted to erode their dependency on the 
Middle Eastern natural resources perceived the region as an alternative to oil and gas 
reserves in the Middle East. Despite initial optimistic predictions, the Caspian Basin 
proved to be inadequate to compete with the Middle East region. Nevertheless, oil and 
gas reserves in the Caspian Basin are certainly significant. The Caspian Basin might not 
be an alternative to the Middle Eastern energy resources but it presents a diversification 
opportunity for the Western countries. 
 
 
4. 4. Pipelines in the Caucasus 
 
Although the Caucasus states have oil and gas resources, the region’s importance is 
linked with the fact that it serves as an energy corridor. Rich oil and gas resources are 
connected to Europe via pipelines that cross through the Caucasus. The political 
geography of the region makes it probable that there will be more than one new major 
export system for oil but it is not like that more than one single new gas pipeline system 
will be constructed by the West since oil pipelines are easier to build than gas pipelines 
(Roberts, 1996). The Western countries seek new ways to build new pipelines to elude 
their dependency on Russia’s dominance on energy supply routes.  
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Pipelines offer significant economic and political advantages to the countries 
through which pipelines pass. Those countries enjoy substantial income from transit 
fees. Pipeline construction and operation means jobs and supporting infrastructure 
important to local economies (Karagiannis, 2002). In addition to economic 
developments, countries through which pipelines pass gain political leverage. Whoever 
controls the transportation have control over the flow of the oil.  
 
 
4. 4. 1. Oil Pipelines 
 
Baku-Ceyhan route was a major development that aims to reduce Russian control 
over energy routes. The pipeline which transfers oil runs from the Azerbaijani capital 
Baku on the Caspian Sea up through Georgia, and down to the Turkish Mediterranean 
port of Ceyhan (Baran 2005).  The BTC route does not include Russian territories when 
transporting Azerbaijan oil to the Western territories. Thus, the BTC has significantly 
altered the balance of power in the region, strengthened the political and economic 
autonomy of the states such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, reducing Russian influence 
(German, 2011). Turkey also gained power by making Ceyhan as the main terminal for 
crude oil exports. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is shown in the map: 
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Figure 4: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline 
 
(Starr and Cornell, 2005). 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan is anathema for Russia. Built when Russia was weak, this 
project bypassed Russia for the energy supply. Today, Russia is a strong country ruled 
by a strong leader, Putin. Russia wants to decrease the importance of the BTC by 
strengthening its relations with Azerbaijan (Cagaptay, 2009). Russia tries to enhance the 
role of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline from Baku to Novorossiysk via Grozny and 
Tikhorest, which opened in 1997 (Karagiannis, 2002). This pipeline route increases the 
strategic importance of the North Caucasus. Russia’s control over the North Caucasus is 
significant for itself for full control over Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline.  After the First 
Chechen War which ended the defeat of Russia, Russia had to accept de facto Chechen 
independence. Russia concluded another treaty with Chechnya in September 1997 
agreeing to pay sums of money to Chechen authorities for Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline 
(Kandiyoti, 2008). The Second Chechen War which resulted with the victory of Russia 
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enabled Russia to reassert its authority in the region again. Asserting full sovereignty 
over the North Caucasus allowed Russia to promote Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline route 
to challenge Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline route. Increasing the amount of oil that would 
flow through Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline would reduce the supply of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline. Holding Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline as a pipeline that would 
potentially reduce the amount oil that flows through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan will challenge 
the significance of the BTC. The map indicates the alternative routes to the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. 
 
Figure 5: Alternatives to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline 
 
(Varol, 2013: 190). 
 
There is a competition over the transportation route of Kashagan oil sources of 
Kazakhstan. Tengiz oil field of Kazakhstan is transported through Baku-Novorossiysk 
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pipeline. Western countries try to promote the BTC for the transportation of Kashagan 
oil to world market. There are three possible actions considered for the transportation of 
Kashagan oil. One is to export it through an expanded Caspian Pipeline Consortium or a 
parallel pipeline to the CPS to Novorossiysk. Two further options require oil to be 
brought across the Caspian Sea by tanker or pipeline from Aktau to Baku. One is 
enlarging the capacity of the BTC or building a parallel line to Ceyhan; another is to 
greatly expand the pipeline from Baku to Supsa (Cornell et al., 2005). These alternative 
projects to Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline require great deal amount of investment. The 
South Caucasus’s geopolitical importance will further increase by connecting Central 
Asian oil resources to the Western market. Major Kashagan oil export pipeline is a good 
example of these projects. 
 
Figure 6: Major Kashagan Oil Export Routes 
 
(Kazakhstan consortium achieves first oil production from Kashagan field, 2013). 
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4. 4. 2. Gas Pipelines 
 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline is a pipeline that transports gas extracted 
from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field. It has been built as parallel to the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline. The BTE became operational in December 2006 and has a total 
capacity of 6 bcm per year. Although this pipeline bypasses Russia as an energy route, 
most of the gas is exported to Turkey, and only small amount is sent to Europe via 
transit route through Greece (Badalyan, 2011).   
Supply from the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline is insufficient for Europe to meet its 
gas demand. Thus, Nabucco project is designed to alleviate Europe’s dependency on 
Russia by enabling Europe a direct access to the Caspian oil through Turkey by 
including Kazakh and Turkmen gas. The parties promoting the Nabucco project will 
seek out the possibility of building undersea Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Moreover, 
there is some expectation that Egypt, Syria, and Qatar would connect their natural gas to 
Nabucco. Other potential contributors are Iran and Iraq (Aras and İşeri, 2009). The 
South Caucasus and Turkey are considered transportation centers for Nabucco project.  
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Figure 7: The Proposed Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
 
(European Dialogue, n.d.).  
 
The importance of the Caucasus is once more emphasized with this project. Russia 
would lose its energy card leverage over Europe if a pipeline project that eliminates 
Russian territories will be realized. In order to realize such a project the South Caucasus 
states need to act as transit countries to transport Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas 
resources. Russia needs to exert pressure over the South Caucasus states and to control 
the North Caucasus in order to maintain its monopoly over the energy routes.  
 
 
4. 5. Analysis on the Geopolitics of the Caucasus 
 
The maps presented, geographical and ethnic conditions underlie some important 
considerations. The Caucasus is the area where three regional powers intersect: Russia, 
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Turkey and Iran. Geography of the region cannot be separated from its politics. 
Geographical conditions hinder or increase these regional powers’ infiltration into the 
region. The key actors are not the Caucasus states but the regional powers since 
geography constrains the options of the Caucasus states. 
In the South Caucasus, Armenia emerges as a most disadvantageous country due to 
the fact that it is surrounded by its traditional enemies Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
Moreover, its landlocked location and closed borders with Turkey hinder its economic 
development. According to research conducted by Forbes in 2011 based on three year 
average statistics for GDP growth and inflation, the current account balance,  Armenia 
was considered the second worst economy among 117 countries (Abrahamyan, 2011). 
Therefore, it has to rely on Russian and Iranian support. Its diplomatic activities are 
limited. It cannot mobilize Armenian ethnic population in Georgia because it does not 
have luxury to antagonize another country in the region. 
Georgia’s ethnic diversity prevents it from imposing full sovereignty over its own 
borders. Since its independence, Georgia engaged in civil wars with its ethnic minorities. 
Russia’s intervention into these wars has been determinant. In order to free itself from 
Russian intervention, Georgia needs Western support. It tries to sell its geographic 
position to the Western countries which seek ways to diversify their energy routes. 
Alexander Rondeli, who is a senior diplomat in the Georgian foreign ministry, 
acknowledges this situation: “We are beggars, but we would rather be beggars than live 
under Moscow’s yoke again” (Kleveman, 2003: 31).  
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Azerbaijan with its geographical position and oil resources has means to follow a 
balanced foreign policy. It has rich oil resources. It shares borders with three regional 
powers: Russia, Iran and Turkey. Thus, it can play important role in diversification of 
energy routes that transports Caspian oil resources. This position of Azerbaijan gives it a 
bargaining power with its relations with the Russian Federation. Azerbaijan, thus, is able 
to balance Russian interests. Nakhchivan is extremely important for Azerbaijan because 
this territory allows Azerbaijan to establish direct contact with Turkey, which is 
Azerbaijan’s important ally in the region. It gains leverage against Armenia and Russia 
by enabling Azerbaijan to receive more Turkish support with direct border line. 
Although the North Caucasus is not rich in terms of natural resources, it is important 
for Russia to exert pressure upon the South Caucasus and to prevent alternative energy 
supply routes. Novorossiysk port is an important port on the Black Sea. Russia wants to 
use Baku-Novorossiysk route as a main transportation route, which would diminish the 
importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route. The North Caucasus also provides a 
buffer zone against infiltration of the regional powers such as Iran and Turkey.  
Therefore, it secures Russia’s southern borders.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
RUSSIA’S SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY 
 
 
 
The South Caucasus is of interest to Russia for its security and economy. The main 
factors why Russia is interested in the South Caucasus are that the South Caucasus 
borders on the North Caucasus, which generates troubles for Russia’s security; the South 
Caucasus separates Russia from its major southern partners, which are Turkey and Iran; 
there is potential that the ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus might have spillover 
effect in Russia; and the states of the region play important role in the development of 
the mineral resources of the Caspian Basin (Naumkin, 2002). 
After their independence, the South Caucasus states became the part of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the organization of former Soviet republics 
that was founded as a result of the initiatives of the Russian government. Russia uses the 
CIS as a means to set influence over the former Soviet republics. Russia’s policies 
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towards CIS countries, which include the South Caucasus states, have three dimensions: 
political, economic/energy, and military. On the political side Russia has tried to bolster 
governments which are willing to establish cooperative policies with Russia. In 
economic and energy relations, Russia tries to monopolize its control over energy routes 
in order to maintain its dominant position in the CIS region. On the military and national 
security side, Russia tries to promote the role of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), which grew out of the framework of the CIS for counterterrorism, 
intelligence, and border security issues. (Kramer, 2008). Russia uses this organization to 
prevent its former republics from developing an independent military and security 
organs instead of a pure military alliance.  
Although Russia has been involved in the South Caucasus affairs, its policy has been 
inconsistent. The geopolitical approaches discussed among Russian scholars and 
statesmen in the 1990s have been responsible for this inconsistency. During 1990s, 
Yeltsin’s presidency, Moscow’s foreign policy had two dimensions: the Euro-Atlantic 
trend, which saw Russia’s future in Europe as an equal member of Euro-Atlantic 
civilized nations and the Eurasian trend, which was unwilling to recognize the 
independence of former Soviet republics and aimed to establish control over these 
countries (Abushov, 2009). This dual character of foreign policy affected Russia’s 
policy towards the South Caucasus. While the concentration of Russian forces in 
Transcaucasia was cut down, Moscow tried to be involved in emerging process in the 
South Caucasus (Naumkin, 2002). Nevertheless, the foreign policy guidelines and 
security concepts prepared during Yeltsin’s presidency asserted the privilege position of 
the Russian Federation in the affairs of the CIS countries, which Russia regarded as its 
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‘Near Abroad’. The spillover effect of the ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus and the 
need for Russian intervention were emphasized in all statements and official policy 
guidelines (Abushov, 2009). The South Caucasus remained the sphere of interest of 
Russia even during Yeltsin’s presidency when Westernization policies had been pursued 
ardently. Russia intervened in the ethnic wars in Georgia and the war between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia and placed its peacekeeper forces in the region. Thus, it gained 
military presence which would enable it to influence events in the South Caucasus. 
Under the presidency of Putin Russia demonstrated a noticeably renewed interest in 
the South Caucasus. Appraising the expansion of NATO, Russia fought hard to prevent 
the integration of the South Caucasus into NATO and EU (Kelkitli, 2008). Russian 
foreign policy under Putin has been more coherent than that of his predecessor. The 
strengthening of the Russian international position enabled Russia to initiate large 
investment projects in the CIS and abroad to increase its economic influence. Russia 
pursued policies directed at gaining leverage against the South Caucasus states 
(Abushov, 2009). Ethnic problems offer this leverage to Russia in the region. Russia 
constantly exploits ethnic problems that exist among South Caucasus republics. 
Nagorno-Karabakh problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan is good example of 
Russian endeavors to utilize ethnic problems in the South Caucasus. Russia maintains its 
military base in Armenia. At the same time, Russia continues to deliver its weapon 
package supply to Azerbaijan. Achieving a military balance among the Caucasus states 
is not Russia’s primary objective. Rather, Moscow wants to bolster security ties while 
ensuring Armenia and Azerbaijan remain at odds over Nagorno-Karabakh issue (In the 
Caucasus, Russia Secures Its Position by Exploiting Regional Tensions, 2013).   
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Russia has different approaches and relationship levels with three South Caucasus 
republics. In order to achieve the success in the South Caucasus, Russia adopted a carrot 
and stick approach-with the stick usually reserved for Georgia, and the carrots for 
Armenia. In relation to Armenia, Russia uses economic and security cooperation to 
ensure Armenia toes its line by supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan. On the other 
hand, Russia set out to teach a lesson to Georgia with 2008 war. (Snetkov, 2013). 
Azerbaijan with its vast energy sources has leverage against Russia so it tries to follow a 
more balanced foreign policy. Azerbaijan declined to join the Customs Union, planned 
to be established among the former republics of the Soviet Union, Russia is concerned 
with ensuring Azerbaijan would not serve as an energy diversification to Europe 
(Russia's Customs Union to Eurasian Union: An Evolution (Part 2), 2012). Russia wants 
to involve in the security issues in the region and to control the routes of energy sources. 
Russia’s South Caucasus policy can be best understood if its relations with the states in 
the region are analyzed in detail.  
 
 
5. 1. Russia-Armenia Relations 
 
Armenia has the most disadvantageous geographical position in the South Caucasus. 
It is surrounded by its traditional enemies and landlocked country. Unlike other South 
Caucasus republics, it is cut off from strategic transportation routes. These unfavorable 
conditions caused Armenia to seek foreign support. Russia emerged as an ally for 
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Armenia in the region. Russia-Armenia relations have historical roots. These relations 
were founded a common vision of security issues aimed at thwarting the influence of the 
Ottoman Empire in the key region of the South Caucasus. The bilateral alliance survived 
the fall of the Soviet Union. This alliance of Armenia and Russia is rooted in distrust of 
Azerbaijan’s policies in the region: pan-Turkism, refusal to join the CIS, agreement with 
the USA in the construction of oil pipelines bypassing Russia (Minassian, 2008). Early 
in the independence process, Yerevan considered that Russia is the main power affecting 
the Caucasus region and concluded that it should ally with Russia to achieve its security 
and strategic goals. Therefore, Armenia allowed Russia to maintain military bases and 
deploy troops in its territory (Shaffer, 2010). Russia’s influence over Armenia is 
significant to Russia due to the fact that Armenia provides a natural barrier to Turkey’s 
accession to the Caspian Basin and the Central Asia.  
During the disintegration process of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s policies aimed at 
holding on grip on power in Armenia. Not all groups shared the idea that Russia was the 
best option for Armenia. The Armenian National Movement, formed in 1989, concluded 
that the Soviet Union was crumbling and the question of liberation of Karabakh, which 
had been part of Azerbaijan SSR, could only be achieved through an independent 
Armenia. The most important innovation that the ANM brought in Armenian political 
thought was that the ANM considered it possible to have normal relations with Turkey 
and this was the only way to achieve liberation from Armenia’s historic dependence on 
Russia. Soviet troops participated in deportation 10.000 ethnic Armenians from the 
Shahumian region (north of Karabakh) as a response to the ANM’s politics (Cheterian, 
2009). This conception of the ANM challenges the idea of traditional enmity between 
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Armenia and Turkey. Moscow articulated that any rapprochement attempt with Turkey 
would not go unpunished.  
After the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 
region elevated into interstate level. Nagorno-Karabakh, composed of Armenian 
majority but part of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, also declared its 
independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This declaration of independence 
fuelled the conflict and Armenia and Azerbaijan were at the war. Having understood 
Moscow’s earlier message, Armenia turned to Russia for military support against 
Azerbaijan. Armenia abandoned its policy of seeking maximal sovereignty and reversed 
its demand for the withdrawal of Russian bases in Armenia (Abushov, 2009). Russian 
support to Armenia resulted in several victories against Azerbaijan. Russian assistance 
was key to creating an air defense system in Karabakh which neutralized the Azerbaijani 
air superiority. Russia also provided necessary military hardware for the Armenian 
offensive of 1993 (Cheterian, 2009). Such assistance was not without price. In exchange 
for Russian support, Armenia allowed Russia to maintain its bases and deploy its troops 
in its territory (Shaffer, 2010).  Russia continued its military alliance with Armenia and 
support Armenia militarily and economically after the war. The relationship between 
two countries remained strong during 1990s. Both sides emphasized the Russian role in 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus.  
During Putin’s presidency Russia’s preponderant status in Armenia has been 
strengthened. On September 14, 2001, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and his 
counterpart Serzh Sargsyan signed documents containing agreements over sending 
Russian military advisors and specialists to Armenia and assuring them favorable 
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conditions. Furthermore, the 102
nd
 Russian base in Armenia was given a new territory 
(Kelkitli, 2008). Joint military exercises between two countries became routine events. 
Russia provided training of Armenian officers and transferred material from Russian 
bases (Nygren, 2008). The authority of Russian military troops in Armenia was extended 
over time. On November 11 2003, Sergey Ivanov and his counterpart Serzh Sargsyan 
concurred on a military cooperation agreement which the Russian military facilities at 
Gyumri were merged into one base. Ivanov also stated that Russia would continue to 
supply Armenia with weaponry and military hardware (Kelkitli, 2008). Putin referred 
the relationship between Russia and Armenia as strategic partnership (Nygren, 2008). 
This strategic partnership evolved into Russian military domination over Armenia in 
2010. According to a military protocol signed in August 2010, the geographical scope of 
responsibility of the 102
nd
 base in Armenia has been extended to cover the entire 
territory of Armenia, not just the protection of borders, and the duration of the 102
nd
 
base has been prolonged (Minasyan, 2013). Armenia provides the territory where Russia 
can locate its military troops in the South Caucasus.  
The main developments in relationship between Armenia and Russia during Putin’s 
presidency occurred in the economic field. Armenia suffered economic crisis after the 
end of the Soviet Union. The war with Azerbaijan worsened the economic situation. 
Russia was the main helper of Armenia. The unequal economic relationship between 
Armenia and Russia resulted in enormous debt burdened by Armenia. In 2001, an asset-
for-debt agreement was signed between Russia and Armenia (Nygren, 2008). This 
agreement caused the transfer of strategic assets of Armenia to Russia. Especially 
Armenian energy sector was turned over Russian control. In February 2003, the 
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financial management Medzamor nuclear power plant was passed to Russia’s UES in 
exchange for paying off Armenia’s $40 million debt to Russian nuclear fuel suppliers. In 
August 2003, Armenia signed an agreement which turned over the Sevan-Radzansky 
hydropower plant for the purpose of wiping out the debts. In September 2005, the 
Armenian government sold Armenia’s national power grid by British Midland 
Resources Holding to Interenergo, a subsidiary of UES (Kelkitli, 2008). Moreover, in 
2003 the ownership of six hydroelectric power plants were transferred to Russia and 
three Armenian research institutes, a thermal power plant and an electric power plant 
were acquired by Russia (Nygren, 2008). Armenia’s energy sector came under the 
control of Russia. 
Russian purchases in Armenia have not been confined in the energy sector. 
Armenia’s various industrial complexes and strategic assets were transferred to the 
ownership of Russian companies. Communication sector was one of these sectors. On 
14 November 2006,- the Armenian government gave its approval for the acquisition of 
the 90 percent stake of the Armenian Telephone Company (ArmenTEl) by the Russian 
mobile phone operator VimpelCom. Russia’s Comstar Telesytems declared that it had 
obtained 75 percent of the shares of Armenia’s second largest telecommunication group 
CallNet and the internet service provider, CorNet. Russian telecommunications operator 
MTS purchased Armenia’s largest mobile phone network, VivaCell, from a Lebanese 
company in September 2007 (Kelkitli, 2008). Armenia’s transportation sector was also 
bought by Russian companies. Russia’s Sibir Airline was granted the bulk of the flight 
rights of Armenian Airlines, after agreeing to assume $25 million in debts (Danielyan, 
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2003). Russian South Caucasus Railways obtained the right to manage Armenia’s 
existing railway (Kelkitli, 2008).  
Armenia is the most loyal country of Russia in the South Caucasus. It depends on 
Russia both militarily and economically. Russia has almost absorbed Armenia’s 
economic and security sectors. Armenia’s dependence on Russia has deepened after 
Armenia’s decision to join the Customs Union, which is an attempt of Russia to increase 
its influence over former-Soviet states and to take part in Russia’s planned debut of the 
Eurasian Union. On September 3, 2013, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan announced 
that Armenia will join to the Customs Union. Putin said Armenia’s decision will be 
beneficial for both countries (Armenia: Country To Join Customs Union, 2013). This 
decision indicates that Armenia will remain Russia’s sphere of influence in future. 
 
 
5. 2. Russia-Azerbaijan Relations 
 
Azerbaijan has few geopolitical advantages which allow it to pursue a balanced 
foreign policy in the South Caucasus. It has a tiny direct border with its ally Turkey 
through Nakhchivan. It borders the Caspian Sea and has rich oil and gas resources which 
empower its status. Transportation of these energy resources to the world market offers 
Azerbaijan power of leverage in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan is 
constrained by its external surroundings. It is located between three strong countries: 
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Russia, Iran and Turkey. Therefore, Azerbaijan has to follow a careful balanced foreign 
policy. The USA and the EU also diverted their interests to Azerbaijan due to energy 
resources and its geographical positions. Thus, Azerbaijan is focal point of competition 
in the South Caucasus. Brzezinski claims that “the independence of the Central Asian 
states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to 
Moscow’s control” (Brzezinski, 1998: 25). Azerbaijan’s energy sources and alternative 
energy routes would be vital for Europe to diversify its energy supply. 
 For Russia, Azerbaijan has been strategically important for limiting the alternative 
source of hydrocarbon supplies to the world market, keeping Turkey and Iran from its 
borders, preventing secessionist attempts in the North Caucasus, protecting Russia’s 
coastal areas on the Caspian and the Black Sea, and limiting the West’s attempts to 
reach to Central Asian resources. These reasons are related with Russia’s claim of being 
a great power. For Azerbaijan, Russia represents an imperial power which dominated its 
territory during the Soviet Union (Aslanlı, 2010). Russia seeks to keep Azerbaijan in its 
sphere of orbit in order to prevent Azerbaijan from emerging as an alternative energy 
supplier for European countries. 
There are several factors that affected Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Russia’s self-
perception, Russia’s material interests and Azerbaijan’s foreign policy preferences, 
which are product of its domestic politics, are three main factors which influenced the 
relationship between two countries. Russia’s self-perception as a dominant power in 
Eurasia affects its policy towards Azerbaijan by asserting the eventual integration of the 
former Soviet republics. Concerning material interests, Russia tries to secure the North 
Caucasus, which is adjacent to Azerbaijan and avoid Western penetration into the South 
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Caucasus. Russia also wants to restore its control over natural resources of Azerbaijan. 
Lastly, Azerbaijan’s presidents’ orientations affect their foreign policy choice towards 
Russia (Gül, 2008).  
After the first years of the independence, Nagorno-Karabakh war was the main event 
that determined the course of the relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan. Russian 
involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Armenian side strained the 
relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. The massacre of Azerbaijanis by 
Armenians in Khojaly with Russian assistance caused an outrage in Baku. Ayaz 
Mutalibov, who had pro-Russian stance, was forced to resign as a result of 
demonstrations led by the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party. Abulfez Elchibey, who had a 
pro-Turkish stance, became president (Cheterian, 2009). Under the presidency of 
Elchibey, Baku rejected institutionalized security cooperation with Russia. Azerbaijan 
refused to join the CIS and called for the removal of troops under Moscow’s command 
from Azerbaijan. President Elchibey assumed that the common Turkic background 
would serve as a basis for an alliance with Turkey despite the fact that Ankara showed 
no signs in the early period of wanting to undertake an active role in the region (Shaffer, 
2010). Russia’s economic interests in Azerbaijan were compromised in Elchibey’s 
presidency. Companies of Western origin became active in Azerbaijan and no shares 
were allocated to Russian companies in petroleum agreement (Aslanlı, 2010). During 
this period, Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan were at worst. Russia responded Elchibey 
with two ways. It increased its military support to Armenia, enabling Armenia to occupy 
Lachin corridor which provided the unification of Karabakh. Russia’s second response 
was its support of the coup headed by Huseinov against Elchibey. Russia’s aim was to 
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restore Mutalibov after the coup but Aliyev acted quickly and took office in 1993 (Gül, 
2008). Aliyev drew necessary lesson for his predecessor’s fate and pursued a balanced 
foreign policy and did not try to ignore Russian interests. 
During Heydar Aliyev’s tenure, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy aims at balancing 
relations with major regional and global powers instead of relying on one power 
completely. Thus, Azerbaijan adopted a policy of balancing the interests of Russia and 
the USA, maintaining stable relations with Turkey and Iran (Shaffer, 2010). Aliyev 
avoided any direct actions that might upset Russia. As soon as he became the president 
he cancelled all proposed oil deals conducted by the APF government with the Western 
companies, claiming that these deals were against Azerbaijani national interests (Özkan, 
2006). In 1994, the Aliyev government initiated relations with the Western world but 
Russia’s concerns were taken into consideration. On 20 September 1994, an energy 
agreement entitled as ‘Contract of the Century’ was signed for extracting Azerbaijani oil 
to the world. Russian company Lukoil was given %10 of share (Aslanlı, 2010). Russian 
response to this deal was rather ambiguous. The Russian Energy Ministry and the 
Russian Foreign Ministry reacted differently to ‘the Contract of the Century’. While the 
Russian Energy Ministry backed by the Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin supported 
the deal, the Foreign Ministry announced that it would not recognize the deal (Özkan, 
2006). This disagreement reflects the dual character of the foreign policy towards the 
CIS countries during Yeltsin’s presidency.  
There are number of issues that prevented the development of Russia-Azerbaijan 
relations. The most important disagreement between two countries is Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Russia used this conflict as a lever against Baku to impose conditions, to force 
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Azerbaijan to enter to the CIS, to use the resources of the Caspian Sea jointly and to 
guard the country’s borders with Turkey and Iran (Abushov, 2009). The situation in 
Nagorno-Karabakh continued to affect Azerbaijan’s foreign policy formulation. 
Negotiations continue over Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
via the mediation of Russia. Azerbaijan views Russia as a party to the Karabakh conflict. 
However, Russian support to Armenia created suspicion. Azerbaijani skepticism towards 
Russian motives has contributed rendering the peace negotiation process difficult and 
created problems for bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Russia (Kjærnet, 2009). 
It is not difficult to understand Azerbaijani’s concerns over Russian intentions. Russia 
acts as both mediator and provider of security of Armenia. Russia seems to do 
everything as a negotiator to reach a settlement while in reality to do everything it can to 
prevent such a settlement (Dispatch: Russia's Control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue, 
2011). The resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh would also cultivate Azerbaijan and 
Armenia relations. Armenia, thus, would not want to depend on Russia in economic and 
security fields if Nagorno-Karabakh issue resolves. Nagorno-Karabakh issue legitimizes 
the existence of the Russian troops located in Armenia. The military existence of Russia 
in Armenia offers Russia leverage against Azerbaijan. Russia, therefore, would not want 
a resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh issue. 
While Russia helped Armenia during Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan allegedly 
involved in the First Chechen war. Azerbaijan’s alleged involvement led to harsh 
Russian criticism. Russia claimed that Azerbaijan helped rebel forces during the First 
Chechen War. Although Azerbaijan refused this claim, Russia imposed an embargo for 
three years. This was a heavy blow considering 70 percent of Azerbaijani trade had been 
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Russia bound (Aslanlı, 2010). Russia feels vulnerable against threats that may emanate 
from the South Caucasus into its North Caucasus area. Thus, this geopolitical 
consideration plays important role in Russia’s Azerbaijan policy. 9/11 events created 
allergy to any group affiliated with Islamic orientation. Following the start of the Second 
Chechen War, Azerbaijan prosecuted Chechen rebels and extradited them to Russia. 
Moreover, in 2002, the Azerbaijani authorities closed down the Chechen schools and the 
cultural center (Kelkitli, 2008). This disagreement between Azerbaijan and Russia over 
Chechnya indicates the inextricability of the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus.  
Another source of dispute between is over the status of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan considered the Caspian as a sea. Russia and Iran claimed 
that the Caspian is not a sea but it is a lake. They demanded equal and cooperative 
exploitation of the Caspian reserves. Russian claim, however, concerning the Caspian 
Sea changed after Russian interests were partially satisfied in the Azerbaijani oil 
business (Gül, 2008). In October 2003, with the participation of Kazakhstan, a trilateral 
agreement was signed, dividing the northern sixty-four percent of the Caspian Sea into 
three unequal parts according to median line principle, allocating Kazakhstan twenty- 
seven percent, Russia nineteen percent and Azerbaijan eighteen percent (Kelkitli, 2008).  
Besides conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Caspian Sea, the situation 
of remaining Russian forces in Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Soviet Union is 
object of negotiation between two countries. Azerbaijan managed to get Russian troops 
to withdraw but Russian presence remained in the Gabala radar station. The importance 
of the Gabala radar station is high. “The radar station has a range of up to 6.000 
kilometers, and was designed to cover Iran, Turkey, India, Iraq and the entire Middle 
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East” (Evoyan, 2013: 40). Although the Gabala radar station serves a military purpose, 
Russia has much more advanced early radar systems elsewhere. For example, Voronezh 
radar system located in Armavir in the Black Sea represents a major breakthrough 
comparing to other radar systems. For Russia, paying rent on Gabala and its inferior 
radar technology will not be financially worthwhile (Russia, Azerbaijan: A Politically 
Significant Radar Station, 2012). Since the radar station provided a military presence in 
Azerbaijan to Russia, Russia did not want to abandon it. Thus, negotiations have been 
carried out to determine its future.  Finally, the status of the Gabala Radar Station, 
another thorny matter between Azerbaijan and Russia was resolved during Putin’s 
presidency. The agreement acknowledged that the property of the radar station belongs 
to Azerbaijan but it was rented to Russia for a ten year lease (Kelkitli, 2008). In 2012, 
Azerbaijan demanded $300 million for a year instead of the existing $7 million for the 
continuation of the radar system. For this high price, Russia decided to cancel its 
operations and close the radar base (Herszenhorn, 2012). This closure also indicates that 
Azerbaijan does not always follow Russia’s line. 
In order to consolidate its grip on Azerbaijan, Russia wants to bring Azerbaijan into 
the Custom Union integration process. This integration would mean the loss of 
Azerbaijan’s autonomy over its energy policy because the organization brings joint 
custom rules. Therefore, Azerbaijan does not plan to be a member of the Custom Union 
and the Eurasian Union. “In terms of the Customs Union, Azerbaijan has recently 
announced that it would not join the union but instead implement its own customs code 
and seek to integrate customs with Turkic countries such as Turkey and Kazakhstan” 
(Russia's Customs Union to Eurasian Union: An Evolution (Part 2), 2012). While 
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Azerbaijan avoids Moscow dominated the Customs Union, Russia increased pressure 
over Azerbaijan. For a long time, Moscow abstained from using ethnic card against 
Azerbaijan as it was preoccupied with its own separatism in the North Caucasus. 
However, from the beginning in September 2012, certain developments indicated that 
Moscow had returned the policy of using ethnic minorities, which are Armenians, 
Talysh, Avars and Lezgins, against Azerbaijan. Several conferences were held in 
Moscow and Dagestan concerning the rights of the minorities that exist in Azerbaijan 
(Valiyev, 2013). For Russia, using ethnic card against Azerbaijan might not be the most 
effective foreign policy but it serves as a signal of Russia’s displeasure of Azerbaijan’s 
relative independent foreign policy. 
Azerbaijan is the most important country in the South Caucasus, geopolitically. Its 
energy resources and transit position on energy routes offer Azerbaijan to pursue an 
independent foreign policy. Russia constantly attempts to distort this independent 
foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s close collaboration with Turkey and the 
Western world could jeopardize Russia’s dominant status over energy supply routes. 
Therefore, Russia pressures Azerbaijan in several areas. Nagorno-Karabakh issue is the 
most important problem for Azerbaijan since its territorial integrity is violated. Russia 
gains leverage against Azerbaijan by supporting Armenia financially and militarily in 
this problem. Russia also tries to use ethnic card against Azerbaijan. Russian support to 
Armenia in the Nagorno Karabakh issue and exploiting Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs, 
however, might be counter-productive by driving Azerbaijan into more strict alliances 
with outside powers. 
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5. 3. Russia-Georgia Relations 
 
Georgia is located in a transcontinental zone between Europe and Asia. It borders 
Russia on the strip of the Caucasus. Georgia, as the northernmost country in the 
Caucasus is an Achilles heel of Russia. It also flanks Russia’s North Caucasus republics 
and acts as a buffer between Islamic influences from the south and Russia’s Muslim 
regions (Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities, 2010). Georgia is the 
only sea-abutting state of all republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Shaffer, 2010). 
Therefore, Russia prioritized to consolidate Georgia. In the 19
th
 century Georgia was 
incorporated into the Russian Empire and it had remained under the Russian rule until 
1991. Although there are strong traditional ties exist between two countries since 
Georgia was part of a common state with Russia over 200 years, there is mutual 
accusation for each other’s backwardness (Markedonov, 2007).  
Due to Georgia’s mountainous terrain, Georgia’s non-Georgian ethnic groups have 
maintained autonomy. These groups, which include Abkhazians, Ossetians, Svans, 
Armenians and Turks were able to preserve their culture and identity. Ethnic problems 
of Georgia encourage Russia to intervene in Georgia’s domestic politics constantly. The 
Soviets organized Georgian territory so as to exploit ethnic and inter-communal 
differences. Best exemplifying the Soviet reorganization are the Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians, who were given their own autonomous republics within the Georgian Soviet 
republic (Georgia: A Historical Battleground Between East and West, 2013). Since its 
independence, Georgia engaged in civil wars with Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
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integrate these regions into Georgia. These inner conflicts provided means for Russia to 
manipulate Georgia. Thus, Georgia’s domestic politics and its relations with Russia 
became interconnected. 
From the start of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Georgia became Russia’s 
greatest strategic and foreign policy problem in the South Caucasus (Nygren, 2008). 
Georgia is the only South Caucasus state which has coast on an open sea. It could serve 
a potential trade and energy route for other South Caucasus states. Thus, Russia has 
throughout the post-Soviet period actively attempted to destabilize Georgia in order to 
prevent it from serving as a transit state for the other states in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (Shaffer, 2010). Loosing grip on Georgia would lessen the dependency of other 
South Caucasian states on Russia.  
On the other hand, Georgia wanted to rid of Russian yoke after the independence. 
Independent policy for Georgia is invariably linked to an anti-Russian policy. A 
resistance identity evolved in Georgia against Russian rule when the President 
Gamsakhurdia initiated nationalistic rhetoric. This nationalistic rhetoric frightened the 
autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other hand, Gamsakhurdia 
proposed the idea of a ‘Caucasian House’ which was supported by Chechnya and 
Azerbaijan making possible for the primary anti-Russian coalition in the Caucasus. 
However, deterioration of the relations between Georgia and the provinces of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia helped Russia to establish an enemy image of Georgia in the 
North Caucasus (Abushov, 2009). Gamsakhurdia openly promoted the cleansing of the 
South Ossetians from the country with the aim of driving them to the North Ossetia 
(German, 2006). Gamsakhurdia’s chauvinist policies alienated the North Caucasus 
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people, who felt solidarity with the South Ossetians, who might have contributed to his 
grand Caucasian unification plans.   
In December 1991, Gamsakhurdia was overthrown as a result of clashes in Tbilisi. 
Shevardnadze took the power (Nygren, 2008). Gamsakhurdia and his supporters called 
the rebellion a Russian military coup. “For Gamsakhurdia, the rebellion coincided with 
his refusal to participate in the Alma Ata summit to lay the basis of the Commonwealth 
of Independent State” (Cheterian, 2009: 179). As Elchibey was ousted in Azerbaijan, 
Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in Georgia since he refused to join in the 
Commonwealth of Independent State, which was founded by Russia to maintain its 
influence over the former Soviet states. Gamsakhurdia fled to Mingrelia in Georgia, 
province bordering Abkhazia, where he started to launch an insurgency against 
Shevardnadze leadership (Cheterian, 2009).  
Abkhazia supported this insurgency by forming Confederation of the Mountain 
Peoples of the Caucasus including various ethnic groups in the North Caucasus and local 
Russians. In July, Abkhazia declared its sovereignty (Petersen, 2008). The Mingrelians 
were also staunch supporters of Gamsakhurdia, and did not recognize the legitimacy of 
the State Council formed under the leadership of Shevardnadze (Cheterian, 2009). As a 
result of loss of control over Abkhazia and Mingrelia, Georgia’s ties with its western 
regions were cut. In August 1992, Georgia sent 3,000 troops to restore order. Local 
Russian forces actively participated in the war by providing man power and protecting 
Abkhaz forces from air strikes (Cooper, 2003). Russian support to Abkhazia was 
considerable in Abkhaz resistance. Russian troops united with militia groups to defend 
Abkhazia. They provided military training for Abkhaz forces (Schaefer, 2010). Zvadist 
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forces loyal to Gamsakhurdia took advantage of the conflict and seized the Black Sea 
port of Poti and blocked food supplies to reach Tbilisi. Fearing the complete 
dismemberment of Georgia, Shevardnadze had to call for Russian help to quell the 
insurgency. Zviad Gamsakhurdia died in mysterious circumstances. The consequences 
of Russian support were that Georgia had to join the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, re-entering the Russian influence, agreeing to keep Russian troops on Georgian 
soil. Furthermore, Abkhazia became de facto independent (Petersen, 2008).  
Another region of Georgia, South Ossetia voted in favor of the unification with 
North Ossetia, which is a part of the Russian Federation in 1992. Georgian attempts to 
restore its jurisdiction with the rebellion of the ethnic Georgians who live in South 
Ossetia were crushed by North Ossetian and Russian troops. An agreement signed in 
which Georgia accepted the placement of Russian peacemaker troops in South Ossetia 
as in Abkhazia (Nygren, 2008). After Abkhazia and South Ossetia wars, Shevardnadze 
agreed to join the CIS. In a statement, Shevardnadze explained that he had been forced 
to consent Georgian joining the CIS as a result of the country had been brought to its 
knees (Splidsboel, 2009). The secessionist movements of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
the first years of Georgia’s independence gained success because of Russia’s backing. 
Russia holds these regions as keys to exert pressure over Georgia. 
Although Georgia joined the CIS, its attempts to resist Russian yoke have not ended. 
In order to counter Russian influence over Georgia, the foreign strategy of Georgia 
focuses on decreasing Russian military presence, increasing US military presence in 
Georgia, increasing Georgia’s integration into NATO and preservation of Georgia as a 
main and stable transit state for Caspian energy sources. Thus, Georgia aims to establish 
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domestic stability and renew its territorial integrity (Shaffer, 2010). The Russian military 
bases which were remnants of the Soviet Union posed significance challenge to 
Georgia’s sovereignty. The Russian Military Forces inherited about 1,600 bases and 
facilities in Georgia. In 1995, the two countries signed an agreement on their withdrawal 
but the document was not ratified in the Russian Duma. Nevertheless, in the second half 
of the 1990s, the vast majority of bases were closed down. However, the process was 
riddled with conflicts. By the end of 1999 only four bases remained, Yeltsin and 
Shevardnadze signed a joint statement in İstanbul regarding their fate. The two bases in 
Vaziani and Gudauta were to be closed down in a short time, while the two bases in 
Akhalkalaki and Batumi were to be negotiated separately (Sokov, 2005). Existence of 
Russian military troops on Georgian soil is a clear intimidation against Georgia.  
Georgia wanted to sell its geographical position to gain the support of the Western 
countries to counter Russia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has huge importance for 
Georgia. It was a blow for Russian monopoly over energy supply routes. This pipeline 
project was designed to transport Caspian oil to the European market, bypassing existing 
Novorossiysk pipeline in Russia (Abushov, 2009). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project 
enhanced Georgia’s geopolitical importance by offering the Western countries an 
alternative energy route. The BTC is a major step in anchoring Georgia to Europe. By 
itself, it strengthens its economic security; and it is a sine qua non for the 
implementation of other oil and gas projects (Cornell et al., 2005). In geo-economic 
terms, Georgia’s position is situated along the quickest route linking Europe with Asia, a 
fact that has naturally led to emergence of the idea of reviving the ancient Silk Road. 
Ultimately, this translated into projects like TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe 
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Caucasus Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe). These 
projects have importance not only for Georgia’s economy, but also that for the entire 
Caucasus (Papava, 2005). Russia would strongly resist the implementation of these 
projects since these projects would increase Western influence on Georgia and the South 
Caucasus.  
As a sign of inextricable links between the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus, 
Chechnya issue became a problem for Georgia and Russia. During the First and the 
Second Chechen Wars, Chechen rebels have been able to cross Russian-Chechen border 
to Georgia due to perforated borders of the former Soviet Union (Nygren, 2008). Russia 
kept reproaching Georgia for the presence of Chechen insurgents in Pankisi Gorge 
region of Georgia. Yeltsin asked Shevardnadze to use military bases in Georgia to 
conduct attacks against Chechen rebels, Shevardnadze refused this request. (Kelkitli, 
2008). Georgia neither had power nor the desire to attack Chechens. Georgia does not 
have the military capacity or transportation facilities to seal its border with Chechnya per 
Russia’s request (Russia Tries to Force Georgia's Cooperation, 1999).  Alexander 
Rondeli, who was a senior diplomat in Georgian foreign ministry, commented that: 
“Why should we let in Chechnya? After all, they are our neighbors and we always strive 
to get on well with them. We respect them, they are great warriors” (Kleveman, 2003: 
34). After 9/11, the security environment has changed in the South Caucasus. Islamist 
Chechens were discredited by the Western powers, with which Georgia wants to 
establish close relations. This has changed Georgia, Chechnya and Russia relations. In 
November 2001, planes coming from Russian airspace bombed the Valley. In September 
2002, Putin argued that the self-defense principle of the UN charter gave Russia to 
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secure the Russian-Georgian border. After this ultimatum, the two sides reached 
agreement and Georgia arrested a number of Chechen militants and extradited to Russia 
(Kelkitli, 2008). This Chechen example indicates that Russia’s security in the North 
Caucasus is invariably linked with the South Caucasus. Russia experienced trouble in 
controlling Chechen insurgency when its relations were troubled with Georgia. 
The troubled relations have worsened after the overthrow of Shevardnadze. The 
Rose Revolution in Georgia that occurred in 2003 brought anti-Russian and pro-Western 
government in Georgia. Under the new president Saakashvili, who came to power as a 
result of Rose Revolution, Georgia’s foreign policy evolved into full out alignment with 
the USA and articulate desire to join NATO as a full member (Shaffer, 2010). Despite 
Saakashvili’s strong desire of integrating Georgia into the Western world, Russia did not 
want to break the relations with Georgia. Russia tried to construct a positive atmosphere 
for the relations between two countries. In May 2004, Igor Ivanov assured that Russia 
wanted stable and good relations with Georgia and resolution of bilateral problems 
(Nygren, 2008). However, Saakashvili was determined to make drastic changes that 
would deteriorate the relationship between Georgia and Russia. In March 2005, 
Saakashvili demanded the closure of all Russian bases in Georgia (Georgia: Closing 
Russian Bases, 2005). In October 2005, Saakashvili articulated the idea of full 
integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which remained autonomous after civil wars, 
into Georgia and wanted the removal of Russian presence in these regions. Saakashvili 
mentioned a possible U.S. military help for this aim (Georgia: U.S. Peace Initiatives, 
2005).  
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Saakashvili’s moves cause tension Georgia-Russia relations. By early 2006, Russia 
stopped issuing visas Georgians and accused Georgia of searching external enemies to 
divert attention from its domestic politics. In March 2006, Russia banned the wine 
imports from Georgia (Nygren, 2008). On the other hand, Saakashvili went on claiming 
that he had been assured by the EU that EU troops would replace Russian peacekeepers 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia: EU Could Send Peacekeepers, 2007). This 
possibility of placement of the troops Western powers has been the nightmare of Russia 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Georgia and Russia had been moving towards an 
open confrontation with these provocative statements.  
Russia’s position concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia was the triggering factor 
for the escalation of the conflict between Georgia and Russia. A Russian foreign 
ministry spokesman announced: “We respect the principle of territorial integrity, but in 
Georgia’s case territorial integrity is still more of possibility than a political and legal 
reality” (Abushov, 2009: 199). Nevertheless, Saakashvili was determined to turn this 
possibility into a reality. He also wanted to pay back the political credits he has received 
and boost its popularity and reputation as a patriot and defender of Georgian unity 
(Markedonov, 2007). The possible Western support encouraged Saakashvili to increase 
his aggressive moves. Sources in Georgian government reported that in private, Bush 
told Saakashvili that the USA supports the Georgian leader’s nationalist agenda 100 
percent and encouraged him to continue to push aggressively towards achieving his 
goals (Georgia: Neutrality in Public, Taking Sides in Private, 2005). However, this 
promise of support did not evolve from rhetoric into action when it was needed.  
70 
 
On 7 August 2008, Georgia commenced a military operation to reassert its authority 
in South Ossetia. On 9 August 2008, Georgian officials declared that Georgia had full 
control of South Ossetian capital. On August, Russia was able to push the Georgian 
troops out of South Ossetian capital, Tshkinvali (Antonenko, 2008). After five days of 
war, Russia not only expelled the Georgian forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia but 
also invaded Georgia. Georgian government declared a unilateral ceasefire. On 12 
August 2008, Georgia and Russia agreed on an armistice and Russia began to pull out its 
troops. On August 14, Georgia terminated its membership of the CIS (Kelkitli, 2008). 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognized as independent states by the Russian 
Federation on 26 August 2008 (Antonenko, 2008). Russian victory was decisive in terms 
of militarily and politically. 20 percent of Georgian territory has been separated from 
Georgia. 
The Russia-Georgia War of 2008 was important in many important aspects. It 
reestablished the credibility of the Russian army whose reputation was damaged due to 
Chechen wars. By invading Georgia, Russia was able to demonstrate that it has the 
superior army in the region. More importantly, this war indicated that American and 
European guarantees for the South Caucasus states have no value. “The Russians knew 
the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. 
The more senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russian 
wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk” (Friedman, 
2008b). Other South Caucasus republics learned the lesson from Georgian case. Relying 
on Western powers would increase their risks not their security. In this aspect, this war 
caused other states, which are located in Russian periphery, to reevaluate their relations 
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with Russia. Five Days War showed that the balance of power has changed in favor of 
Russia in the Caucasus.  
Russia also used the consequences of the 2008 war with Georgia as means to return 
to its former great power status. After the 2008 war, the South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
declared their independence from Georgia and Russia recognized their independence. 
Putin told Russian TV: “As you know we recognized South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
independence in the same way as many European countries recognized Kosovo’s 
independence” (Putin defiant on Caucasus troops, 2008). The recognition of the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was also a response to the recognition of 
the independence of Kosovo despite Russia’s objections.  
The newly established states in Georgian territory would not survive without 
Russia’s help. Therefore, Russia increased its military presence in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Russia has signed friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaties with 
Georgia’s breakaway regions. The agreements state that Russia will help the republics 
protect their borders and give the Kremlin the right to establish military bases on their 
territories. Russia is now set to keep 7600 soldiers in these regions, more than the 
number present before the war (Mikhelidze, 2009). The placement of new Russian 
troops is not only a violation of Georgian territorial integrity but also a direct threat to 
the existence of Georgia. Russian military units positioned striking distance of Gori, 
were able to sever Georgia’s main east infrastructural links and cut Tbilisi from the coast 
(Georgia: More Russian Troops in Breakaway Regions?, 2009).  
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Russia’s pressure on Georgia has intensified with its enhanced military capability in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia also gained influence in Black Sea by providing 
security for Abkhazia’s port city, Sukhumi. On September 15, 2009, Russia announced 
that it will detain any ships illegally entering the waters of Georgia’s breakaway republic 
of Abkhazia (Russia: Asserting Influence in the Black Sea, 2009). Russia’s declaration 
was a warning against Georgia. Georgia would not try to impose a blockade against 
Abkhazia since its navy was not match for Russian navy.  
After the August war in 2008, the confrontation between Georgia and Russia became 
much more clear-cut. Georgia and Russia are officially enemies. Direct diplomatic 
relations between the two countries have been cut. The Russian leadership declared that 
it would not talk to Saakashvili’s government under any circumstances (Nodia, 2009). 
While Russia enjoys its dominant position, Georgia’s options appear to be limited. The 
alleged Western support proved to be empty talks. Saakashvili’s pro-Western aspirations 
were undermined by the realities brought by the August war. Georgia’s change of policy 
towards Russia’s WTO membership signaled that Georgia would not pursue hardcore 
anti-Russian policies. Georgia reversed its policy of blocking Russia’s accession to 
WTO. In order to ameliorate bilateral relations, in November 2011, Georgia and Russia 
have signed a historic deal which allowed Russia’s accession to WTO (Georgia signs 
trade deal opening Russia's way to WTO, 2011).  
Saakashvili’s popularity in Georgia has faded because of disastrous consequences of 
the August war. The opposition against Saakashvili was unified under the coalition of 
the Georgian Dream Movement led by Bidzina Ivanishvili who is a business tycoon. 
Ivanishvili secured a victory in parliamentary elections in October 2012. Ivanishvili has 
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resumed trade relations with Russia that had been frozen before the August 2008 war 
between Russia and Georgia. He has also set in motion the prospects for increasing 
cooperation in other more strategic areas like energy and security (Georgian Politics 
Shift as Ties with Russia Grow, 2013). Ivanishvili followed a less reliant policy towards 
West while establishing pragmatic relations with Russia. 
Russia’s approach about relations with Georgia, on the other hand, is cautious. In an 
interview conducted with Grigory Karazin, Russian State Secretary and Deputy Foreign 
Minister, he stated that Russia will not abandon its requirements to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. He openly complained about Georgia’s NATO aspirations. Karazin claimed that 
Georgia needs to consider Russia while constructing its foreign policy (Karazin, 2013). 
These statements reflect that Russia does not want surrender its means to manipulate and 
destabilize Georgia.  
Georgian politics has further been transformed with the election of Giorgi 
Margvelashvili as the president backed by the Georgian Dream Movement. Although 
new president is eager to develop warmer relations with Russia, Russia’s military 
presence in the breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, will be an obstacle to 
the development of warmer relations between the two countries. Georgia, therefore, will 
continue to maintain close relations with the West. Russia does not care whether this 
small country follows pro-Russian or pro-Western rhetoric. Russia tolerated an anti-
Russian rhetoric in Georgia since Georgia’s independence. However, when this anti-
Russian rhetoric was materialized as a real threat with the backing of the USA and the 
EU, Russia decided to teach a lesson to Georgia in 2008. In future, Russia continues to 
use its economic and ethnic cards to destabilize Georgia.  
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RUSSIA’S NORTH CAUCASUS POLICY 
 
 
 
The North Caucasus remained the part of the Russian Federation after the dissolution 
of the USSR. The North Caucasus consists of the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
Chechnya, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkassia and Adygea. 
Russia has been faced with fierce resistance in the North Caucasus. Violence still 
continues in the region, which exhaust Russia’s military and economic sources. Despite 
these challenges, it is imperative for Russia to control the North Caucasus. The North 
Caucasus is a part of the Transcaucasus zone, which enables Russia to extend its 
influence over the South Caucasus. It is also a defensive barrier that would restrict other 
regional powers’ intrusion to the Russian territory. Therefore, Russia does not afford 
losing its control over the North Caucasus. However, Russian control was seen as a 
domination of an external power by the locals, which creates difficulties for Russia.  
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To understand Russia’s current policy in the North Caucasus it is necessary to 
examine the legacies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union eras. From the 
beginning Russia’s goals were geopolitical. “Imperial Russia’s conquest of the North 
Caucasus took place in the context of the rising power competition with Persia and the 
Ottoman Empire and of growing concern about the interests of European states in the 
region” (Melvin, 2007: 7). Parts of the North Caucasus were conquered by Russia as 
early as the 1780s. A small scale of resistance organized by Sheikh Mansur was 
unsuccessful (Schaefer, 2010). The Russian Empire’s move towards to the South 
Caucasus could occur only after the suppression of Mansur’s insurgency in the late of 
the 18
th
 century. In 1801, Georgian kingdom was annexed by the Russian Empire. John 
Baddeley (1999: 23-24) describes the Russian strategy in the Caucasus: 
Russia's task should now be clear - in the Caucasus proper, to subdue, on the one 
hand, the Western tribes, who looked for support to Turkey; on the other, the peoples 
of Dagestan and Chechnya; in Transcaucasia, to reunite the Georgian race, defend it 
against Persian and Turk, and enlarge and make safe its boundaries at their expense. 
The annexation of Georgia had geopolitical repercussions. Without further conquest 
in the North Caucasus the road through the Daryal Pass from Vladikavkaz to Tbilisi was 
indefensible. This meant further conflict with the Ottomans and Persia. By 1804, Russia 
was at war with Iran, and by 1807, with Turkey (Dunlop, 1998). The Russian Empire, 
therefore, engaged in further conquest in the North Caucasus to secure its borders, which 
extended its control to the South Caucasus.   
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The North Caucasus is one of the most ethnically diverse regions of the world. 
About 40 different ethnic groups live in the region. All groups held attachment to their 
distinct national or ethnic identities (Sagramoso, 2007). The Soviets utilized the 
differences and conflicts that existed among different ethnic groups in the North 
Caucasus. The administrative measures were implemented between 1922-1936, which 
established new ethno-territorial political entities. This created numerous anomalies, 
because the diversity of the population ensured that new borders cut across regional, 
linguistic, ethno-religious and clan ties. This process was followed by a succession of 
border realignments and territorial transfers, fostering further resentment and hostility 
between neighboring communities (Melvin, 2007). Another policy that the Soviet 
leadership implemented was the purges and massacres. On August 31, 1937, the NKVD 
arrested almost 14000 men in only Chechnya, which represented 3 percent of the 
population and every night there were mass executions. Within a few months virtually 
every civil servant, every Communist party member, all leadership were rounded up, and 
either executed or sent to Siberia. Cadres loyal to Moscow were placed in the North 
Caucasus to extend Moscow’s control over the North Caucasus. (Schaefer, 2010). The 
policy of placement of loyal cadres in the North Caucasus was reinstated by Vladimir 
Putin in 21
st
 century. 
World War II had a profound effect on the region. The German Army reached the 
North Caucasus, on its way to attempt to secure the Caucasian oilfields, and occupied 
some parts of the region until 1943. The Germans promised support for sovereignty to 
those groups that were willing to cooperate (Melvin, 2007). Before the war ended, 
Soviet officials had become convinced that large scale of collaboration occurred 
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between the North Caucasians and the Germans. In 1943 the Soviets embarked on a 
wave of deportation and exile that altered the demographic profile of the North 
Caucasus. More than 300.000 Chechens, 80.000 Ingush, and 37.000 Balkars were sent to 
various parts of the Central Asia in February 1944. The former republics of the exiled 
people were dissolved. The populations of entire villages and districts were wiped away; 
their places were taken away by Russians and other ethnic groups (King, 2008). The 
exiled people were officially rehabilitated in 1957 and 50.000 families returned to the 
Caucasus to reclaim their lands (Melvin, 2007). Their return provoked tension in the 
North Caucasus since territories were rearranged in the region. The legacy of the 
deportation showed its effects especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union when 
nationalities found an opportunity to reclaim their independence. In 1992, North Ossetia 
and Ingushetia fought over the status of Prigorodny region whose status had been 
changed during the deportation (Matveeva, 1999).  
In the 1991, the North Caucasus remained the borders of the Russian Federation. 
Russian control over the North Caucasus, however, was floppy. Russia concerned itself 
primarily with consolidating its relationship with local elites rather than institution 
building as the principal means for improving conditions in the region (Melvin, 2007). 
This approach led to decrease of Moscow’s authority and increase of the local elites. All 
the republics in the North Caucasus became increasingly autonomous in handling their 
affairs while Chechnya opted for secession (Sagramoso, 2007). Yeltsin attempted to 
restore balance of power between Russia and the North Caucasian republics in favor of 
Russia by engaging full scale war.  
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The First Chechen war, from 1994 and 1996, was fought between Russia and the 
self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Dzokhar Dudayev, the nationalist 
president of Checheno-Ingushetia Autonomous Republic, declared the independence of 
the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 1991. Preoccupied by internal struggles and 
economic reform, Yeltsin was not able to respond this declaration immediately. Between 
1991-1994, tens of thousands of people, mostly ethnic Russians, had to flee the republic 
due to violence against the non-Chechen population. Pro- and anti-Dudayev forces 
fought for power and at times used heavy weapons (Melvin 2007). Kremlin though 
Dudayev’s fall was imminent and all it is needed a few tanks and some soldiers. In 
December 1994 federal troops were sent to restore the federal government’s authority in 
the republic (German, 2003). Russia faced humiliating defeat as a result of two years 
fighting. In 1996, Khasavyurt Accord was signed in which Russia agreed to remove its 
troops from Chechnya. In 1997, Chechen president Mashkadov signed a peace treaty 
with Yeltsin stating that both countries agreed to form firm, equal, and mutually 
beneficial relations (Schaefer, 2010). Moscow recognized de facto independence of 
Chechnya with these agreements. 
The loss of Chechnya was a major geopolitical setback for the Russian Federation. 
The independence of Chechnya was perceived as a real threat for further disintegration 
of the North Caucasian republics. Yeltsin evaluated Chechen independence as: “Russia’s 
very statehood, Russia’s very life is at stake” (Yeltsin, 2000). Old Russian anxieties 
concerning foreign incursions resurfaced. There was a fear that if Turks could set up an 
embassy in Grozny, they would turn the North Caucasus as a base behind Russian lines 
(Lieven, 1999). Other scholars considered the leader of Chechen independence 
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movement, Dudayev, as a pawn of Britain. According to this view, Dudayev was 
encouraged by Britain to declare independence of Chechnya. Brzezinski’s The Grand 
Chessboard provided the geopolitical framework for the strategy of the disintegration of 
Russia (Staff, 1999).  
 Russian control over oil routes was endangered as a result of the First Chechen war. 
The presence of independent Chechnya would block the Russian hopes to become 
monopoly in Baku- Novorossiysk pipeline. Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline is Russia’s 
major pipeline for transportation of Caspian resources. Russian control over the Caspian 
energy resources was compromised. “If Russia is to be a key player in the Caspian oil 
business it must control Chechnya or at least peacefully coexist with it, or losing its 
position as the key strategic actor in the Caucasus” (Hughes, 2001: 24). The complete 
loss of control over Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline would prevent Russia to use energy as 
foreign policy tool effectively. Russia, therefore, could not tolerate the loss of Chechnya 
and the North Caucasus. 
In 1999, the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen forces and apartment bombings in 
Moscow gave an excuse for Putin, newly appointed prime minister, to start a war against 
Chechnya. The Russians employed heavy artillery to reduce the structures then, they 
sent the infantry to fight. They were better prepared compared to 1994 war. Many local 
Chechens helped them (Schaefer, 2010). Alongside military campaign, the Kremlin 
introduced a range of political and administrative reforms aimed at restoring federal 
control over Chechnya. On 23 March 2003, a new Chechen constitution was passed by 
referendum. The constitution, which entered into force on 2 April 2003, grants 
Chechnya a significant degree of autonomy but still ties it firmly to Russia’s rule 
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(Melvin, 2007). Since 2006 there has been considerable decrease in the level of fighting 
between federal troops and Chechen insurgents, indicating substantial weakening of the 
insurgency as a result of actions taken by Russian forces and pro-Russian Chechens 
(Sagramoso, 2007). In order to prevent further secessionist attempts, Moscow ensured 
that loyal cadres to the center came to the power in Chechnya. Moscow was able to 
place a pro-Russian leader, Akhmad Kadyrov, to the Chechen presidency and his son, 
Ramzan Kadyrov after the former was killed. A pro-Russian regime was established in 
Chechnya after a decade of separation.  
While condition in Chechnya was stabilized, violence has spread across the North 
Caucasus with the Caucasus Emirate, which is a pan-Caucasian Islamic organization. A 
loose network of autonomous violent groups connected with the Caucasus Emirate has 
developed in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria 
(Sagramoso, 2007). As a result of the activities of these groups, Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
and Kabardino-Balkaria emerged as primary sets of violence due to corrupt 
administrations, unemployment and economic decline (O’Loughlin et al., 2011). 
Moscow started to implement a two-track policy combining the more effective 
coordination of coercive measures with better governance in order to counter threat in 
the North Caucasus (Hahn, 2005). Russia’s policies do not rely on the use of force 
solely. More serious socio-economic policies concentrate on alleviating the harsh socio-
economic conditions in the region which increases the recruitment of people into the 
Islamic groups. 
Placement of pro-Russian regimes in the North Caucasus within a Russian vertical 
power became a key policy of the Russian Federation to fight with separatism in the 
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North Caucasus. This policy is called as Chechenization. Chechenization refers to 
turning over security and political operation in the republic to local allies (O’Loughlin et 
al., 2011). Putin skillfully exploited disagreements between sufi groups and radical 
Islamists within Chechen ranks. He appointed Ahmet Kadyrov as his head of 
administration. After Ahmet Kadyrov’s assassination, his son Ramzan Kadyrov 
succeeded him. His rule represents Russian vertical power to nullify the separatist threat 
(Russell, 2008). The Kremlin also began to replace unpopular, gerontocratic, and corrupt 
leaders in the North Caucasus republics. In 2005, Putin removed the ailing Valery 
Kokov, Kabardino-Balkaria’s Soviet-era Communist Party first secretary from the 
republic’s presidency in favor of an ethnic Kabardian, Arsen Kanokov, who has 
attempted to assuage the concerns of the republic’s young and Muslim Balkar minority. 
In Dagestan, Magomedali Magomedov, the highly unpopular Soviet-era bureaucrat, was 
replaced in February 2006 by the younger and less opulent and corrupt Mukhu Aliyev as 
president. In August, the president of the North Caucasus’s largely non-Muslim republic 
of North Ossetia, Teymuraz Mamsurov, replaced his entire cabinet. In Adygeya, 
President Khazret Sovmen decided not to apply for reappointment. Adygea’s parliament 
approved Putin’s nominee for the presidency, Aslanchery Tkhakushinov (Hahn, 2005). 
Russia appeared to modify its ‘Chechenization’ policy. While picking up loyal 
individuals for the posts of presidency, Russia also tries to appoint less corrupt and more 
popular persons for the presidency of the North Caucasus republics to strengthen the 
center’s authority in the region. 
In addition to administrative measures, Russia implements economic reforms 
throughout the North Caucasus. Transferring economic resources from the center to the 
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North Caucasus was employed by the Russian Federation to reduce poverty. The North 
Caucasus republics receive significant amount of subsidies from the federal government. 
Federal government revenues constitute more than half of local government revenues 
(Vendina et al., 2007). Federal supervision was institutionalized over the use of federal 
subsidies in the region where the corruption is widespread. In 2005, Putin issued a 
decree in September 2005 establishing an oversight and advisory Commission for 
Improving the Socioeconomic Situation in the Southern Federal District under Dmitry 
Kozak’s chairmanship (Hahn, 2005). With this commission, the subsidies are to be more 
justly distributed under the control of the federal government.  
Russia will continue to subsidize the North Caucasus in subsequent years. In June 
2012, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev announced a grandiose federal program for the 
socioeconomic development of the North Caucasus until 2025. The total funding for the 
program will amount to just 1.7 trillion rubles (52.2 billion dollars). The program will 
focus on basic infrastructure projects-construction of schools, hospitals, and housing- 
and creating new jobs in order to reduce unemployment region wide from 16 percent to 
5 percent of the able-bodied population (Russian Government Slashes Funding For 
North Caucasus, 2012).   
Another important development in the North Caucasus is Sochi Olympics 2014. 
Sochi is located in the immediate vicinity of Abkhazia and the politically fragile republic 
of Karachevo-Cherkessia. The geographical location of 2014 Winter Olympic Games 
venue, coupled with economic opportunities (its estimated budget is $30 billion) and a 
variety of ongoing political and security challenges (Secrieru, 2010). Doku Umarov, 
self-proclaimed emir of the Caucasus Emirate, urged Islamic militants to do their utmost 
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to derail the games (2014 Winter Olympics: The Terrorism Threat, 2013). Despite the 
Caucasus Emirate’s threats, the Olympic Games provided opportunity for Russia to 
demonstrate its control over the North Caucasus. Nevertheless, Russia had to implement 
extensive security measures in a highly volatile area. More than 40.000 police and 
30.000 army personnel are expected to be on duty during the games. Surveillance of the 
games will include drones, reconnaissance robots, sonar systems and high-speed patrol 
boats. In January 2014, there will be travel and transport restrictions implemented along 
with enhanced security zones that will cover a large territory outside the internal border 
of Karachay-Cherkessia (more than 322 kilometers, or 200 miles, east of Sochi) and the 
external border between Russia's Krasnodar Krai region and the breakaway Georgian 
territory of Abkhazia (Sochi 2014: A Security Challenge, 2013). These security 
measures cost money and man power but holding Olympic Games in the North 
Caucasus will be an important step to integrate the North Caucasus into the Russian 
Federation.  
While implementing soft power measures, the Kremlin did not completely abandon 
hard power measures. Russian forces assassinated several rebel leaders and emirs 
including Basayev, Khattab, Khalilov, the former presidents Maskhadov and 
Yandarbiyev in order to reduce the quality of the leadership of the insurgency (Hahn, 
2005). Besides directly engaging in operations directly, Moscow established several 
special Chechen battalions made up in large part of former militants with aim of 
delegating counterinsurgency responsibilities to local units. Local security forces were 
granted a free card to conduct their operations against insurgents (O’Loughlin et al., 
2011).  
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The free card given to local forces by the federal government often causes 
misconducts and human right abuses. The most infamous example is the activities of 
militias loyal to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov called as kadryovists. His rule is 
marked with torture of Chechen opponents and assassination of the political rivals in 
Chechnya. Kadyrov’s intimidatory style is not confined to Chechnya. It was reported 
that kadyrovists has been involved in operations in other neighboring republics in the 
North Caucasus. Russian journalists who criticize his rule were assassinated in Moscow. 
Anna Politkovskaya, who had already written disparagingly of Akhmad Kadyrov and 
Ramzan Kadyrov, was shot dead by an unknown assailant outside her apartment in 
Moscow on 7 October 2006 (Russell, 2008). Kadyrov’s foreign policy conducts can also 
be characterized as ambitious. He has offered assistance to South Ossetia to protect it 
from Tbilisi’s military operations. He has met with Jordanian monarch, Kazakhstan’s 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev and the Sultan of Brunei (Hahn, 2005). Kadyrov’s 
audacious and ambitious style of rule might concern Russia because he might develop 
separatist tendencies if he consolidates further power in the North Caucasus at the 
expense of the federal government. Handing over the security operations to the local 
forces in the North Caucasus, thus, can backfire for Russia. 
The North Caucasus is the most unstable region of the Russian Federation. Russia 
fought two wars after the fall of the Soviet Union to suppress Chechen separatism. 
Although Russia seems to control the situation in Chechnya after the Second Chechen 
war, violence has spread across the North Caucasus. Russia tries to address new 
insurgency by assassinating its leaders and trying to ease the socio-economic conditions. 
Russia’s efforts might be considered costly but the North Caucasus region is valuable for 
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Russia. Loss of control over the North Caucasus would threaten loss of Baku-
Novorossiysk pipeline which transports Caspian energy sources to the Black Sea. In 
order to control the Caspian energy sources and exert pressure to the South Caucasus 
states, Russia must control the North Caucasus despite the economic and military costs.
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY 
 
 
 
Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 published by Ministry of Energy 
of the Russian Federation outlines main trends and objectives of Russia’s energy policy. 
Russian energy policy is shaped according to these guidelines listed in the document. In 
this document, it is emphasized that energy sector has vital role in elevating Russia’s 
living standards to those of developed countries. Consistency of the state measures in 
implementing key strategic guidelines for development of the energy sector must be 
realized in order to fully utilize energy sector. The strategic objectives of the foreign 
energy policy are the maximum efficient use for the Russian energy potential for full-
scale integration into the world market and enhancement of Russian position in energy 
sector. Reduction in demand and cut in prices and the Russian dependence on transit 
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countries are listed as potential problems for the enhancement of Russian position in 
energy market (Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030, 2009).   
There are set of geopolitical imperatives that direct Russia’s energy policy. Russia’s 
borders are indefensible. Russia, therefore, engages in expansion to have buffers for its 
security. Thus, Russia is ethnically diverse population. In order to consolidate its control 
over ethnic groups domestically, it needs a stable economy. A stable economy depends 
on revenues extracted from energy resources. Secondly, Russia must have leverage 
against other great powers of the world in order to assert its great power status in the 
world. Energy resources and control over the energy routes provide the leverage that 
Russia needs. If Russia loses its control over the energy routes to Europe, it cannot use 
energy card as an effective foreign policy instrument.  
Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the world with 47, 8 trillion cubic 
meters (Country Comparison: Natural Gas Proved Reserves, 2013). It is third largest oil 
producer after Saudi Arabia and the USA (Country Comparison: Crude Oil Production, 
2012). The Kremlin has used energy revenues to develop its economy and consolidate 
its grip on the country. According to data retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, oil and gas revenues accounted for more than 50% of the federal budget 
revenues in 2012 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). The energy sector, 
thus, contributes the funding of reforms in unstable regions of the Russian Federation. A 
domestically stable and developed Russia depends on the revenues extracted from 
energy. 
88 
 
Beyond revenues, Russia uses energy as a foreign policy card. Russia’s desire to 
establish a multipolar and balanced world order stated in Russia’s foreign policy 
documents could be achieved only by possessing leverage against other great powers of 
the world. Europe gets 25 percent of its natural gas from Russia. That figure rises 
dramatically in Central and Eastern Europe; generally, the closer a country is to Russia, 
the more dependent it is on Russian natural gas. Central Europe with the exception of 
Romania, which has its own reserves, draws roughly 70 percent of the natural gas it 
consumes from Russia (Kaplan and Chausovsky, 2013). The energy sector enables 
Russia to expand and maintain and expand its influence of its neighbors. Russia uses its 
neighbor’s dependence on its energy to influence its foreign decision making by offering 
subsidizes or charging higher prices (Goodrich and Lanthemann, 2013). 
 The gas dispute between Georgia and Russia in 2006 and 2009 were the 
demonstrations of Russian energy strategy. When anti-Russian Yushchenko came to 
power in Ukraine, Gazprom demanded an increase in Ukrainian import prices to 
European netback levels in 2006. It also wanted to pay to transport gas through Ukraine 
in cash, instead of the biggest remaining post-Soviet barter transactions which were 
transit for gas. When Ukraine did not accept Gazprom’s ultimatum, Gazprom cut off its 
supply. Ukrainian gas company, Neftogas, withheld the gas that was supposed to be 
delivered to Europe. Thus, supply to Europe has dropped (Pirani, 2009). Russia 
indicated that it would not subsidize Ukraine, which experienced anti-Russian Orange 
Revolution and established a pro-Western regime. Russia demonstrated its ability to 
manipulate energy supply to Ukraine and Europe. In 2009, the crisis reiterated. Gazprom 
refused to supply gas unless Ukraine paid its debts in previous year. Again Russia cut 
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off supplies, Ukraine diverted volumes destined for Europe. This time, deliveries to 
Europe were completely cut off. Gas flows to Europe returned normal after three weeks 
(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a 
comprehensive assessment, 2009).  Russia effectively presented its case with these two 
events. It stated that it would not maintain the favorable conditions provided for the 
former republics of the Soviet Union if these countries depart from Russia’s orbit.  
Russia has been able to use energy as an effective foreign policy tool only after it 
consolidated state’s control over the energy. Russian energy sector experienced disarray 
and chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result of the energy liberalization 
under Yeltsin, the production fell by half and the energy companies were divided 
between foreign groups and oligarchs. The situation changed under Vladimir Putin. The 
first attempt was to bring energy companies under the state control with nationalization 
of Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft. Then the Kremlin followed an aggressive policy in 
negotiating supply contracts with the former Soviet states to maintain its monopoly for 
energy routes in exporting energy sources to Europe (Goodrich and Lanthemann, 2013). 
Putin also took measures to prevent the energy companies from falling into foreign 
hands again. On April 2008, the Strategic Investment Law was enacted. The Strategic 
Investment Law limits foreign investment in strategic industries, which include oil and 
gas sectors (Ebel, 2009). By establishing state control over energy sectors, the Kremlin 
institutionalized energy as a foreign policy instrument. 
 Faced with supply cut-offs, Europe wants to diversify its energy supply routes. 
Caspian energy sources and the Caucasus have vital significance for Europe to reduce its 
energy dependence on Russia. The Caucasus also connects the Central Asian oil and gas 
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supplies. European control over the Caucasus would mean the decrease of Russian 
control over the energy sources. Javier Solana the High Representative for the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy commented that the EU’s energy security can be 
enhanced with the development of major international pipelines to deliver oil and gas 
from the Central Asia and the Caspian region (Solana, 2006). Thus, the EU 
operationalized several pipeline projects in the South Caucasus that would bypass 
Russia. 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was a major milestone that enhanced Europe’s energy security. 
This project transport Azerbaijani oil through Georgian and Turkish territories without 
including Russia. The 1770 kilometer BTC pipeline has capacity of pumping 1 million 
barrels a day (Kupchinsky, 2005).  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project also created prospects 
that the Central Asian oil supply can be connected to this pipeline. Nazarbaev stated that 
his country may provide oil for BTC. (Saunders and Strukov, 2010). Kazakhstan 
attempts to search alternative routes in delivering oil to Europe rather than depending on 
Russian infrastructure. However, this policy change signifies clear break with the 
relations with Russia. As Crimean crisis showed that Moscow is ready to use military 
power if Russia’s vital interests are at stake in post-Soviet countries.  
Russia wants to decrease the importance of the BTC, which would lessen its control 
of energy routes. Russia had tried to enhance the role of Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline to 
maintain its control over the transportation of Caspian energy sources (Karagiannis, 
2002). Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan are crucial for the viability of this route. 
Azerbaijan’s aim of pursuing independent policy depends on its effectiveness to use its 
energy sources. Therefore, Azerbaijan has been less inclined to prefer Baku-
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Novorossiysk pipeline route. State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) 
announced that it would decrease its oil exports via the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline in 
2006 (Azerbaijan decreases oil exports via Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, 2007). Baku-
Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil routes pipelines replaced Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline. In 2011, Baku-Novorossiysk exported 2.084 million tons out of total 25.006 
million tons of oil (Rustambeyov, 2013).  
Changing political structure in the South Caucasus affected Azerbaijan’s energy 
policy. Georgia, which is crucial to Azerbaijan as a transit state, elected Prime Minister 
and President who are less antagonistic to Russia. Russia enhanced its security ties with 
Armenia. These developments led to reconsideration by Azerbaijan concerning its 
energy policy. Russia and Azerbaijan signed several bilateral deals on energy, economic 
and security agreements during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan in August 2013. 
Two sides discussed that Azerbaijan will resume Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline 
(Azerbaijan's Cautious Cooperation with Russia, 2013). Last agreements signify that 
although Azerbaijan is the most independent country in the South Caucasus, it cannot be 
isolated from Russia. When Russia’s grip on the South Caucasus is tightened, 
Azerbaijan’s oil deals with will be in conformity with Russia. 
 Novorossiysk is also important for the transportation of Central Asian oil resources. 
Caspian Pipeline was built to connect Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field to Russia’s 
Novorossiysk port. It is the only oil export pipeline on Russian territory not controlled 
by Transneft, the Russian state monopoly (Kupchinsky, 2005). However, with Putin’s 
presidency Russia’s control over the international consortium has increased. In October 
2008, Oman government sold its share to Russia (Russia snaps up Oman CPC stake, 
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2008). Russia buys out BP’s share in the consortium in 2009 (BP says Lukoil buys out 
stake in CPC pipeline JV, 2009). In April 2007, Russia’s 24 percent stake in the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium was transferred to Transneft. Putin’s entourage Nikolay Tokarev, 
who has KGB background, was appointed as the president of Transneft (Dellecker, 
2008). Controlling the flow of Central Asian resources via Russia’s North Caucasus port 
of Novorossiysk will give additional power to Russia in reducing the amount of oil that 
flows through the BTC. 
Maintaining control of gas pipelines is far more important for Russia. Russia has the 
largest natural gas reserves in the world. Europe is largely dependent on gas imported 
from Russia. In 2013, Europe imports 34% natural gas from Russia (Ratner et al., 2013). 
With no alternative energy supply Europe has become vulnerable to Russia’s decision to 
increase prices and Russia’s supply cut offs. Russia, thus, gains political power over 
Europe. However, Shah Deniz gas fields and gas sources in the Central Asia may inhibit 
Russia’s monopoly. It is imperative for Russia to control over the transportation of gas 
from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia to Europe. Therefore, Russia has to maintain its 
influence over the Caucasus to control gas corridor which connects gas sources in 
Azerbaijan and in the Central Asia to Europe. 
  Gas pipeline projects were developed by Europe to bypass Russia in transporting 
gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia. The Baku-Erzurum pipeline was developed 
with Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. The BTE’s success is limited to the BTC. 
The BTE remains the BTC’s smaller brother. The BTE carries just over five to six 
billion cubic meters of gas a year along its 918 km system. That represents the 
equivalent of roughly one-eighth of energy carried by the BTC (Roberts, The Southern 
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Corridor: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan's Gas Legacy, 2012). The BTE’s capacity is far from 
bypassing Russia as a main supply line. Europe, therefore, engages in other gas pipeline 
projects that would diminish its dependency on Russian natural gas supply. 
Proposed Nabucco pipeline intended to connect the Central Asian gas sources to 
Europe via the Caucasus and Turkey. It is a 3300 km pipeline that could eventually 
bring 31 billion cubic meters of Caspian, the Central Asian and perhaps the Middle 
Eastern gas to Europe (Barysch, 2011). The Caspian region, especially Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan, and the Middle East- Egypt, Iran and Iraq, are discussed as supply 
sources for the project (Dieckhöner, 2012). Although several candidates are put forward 
for natural gas supply, there is uncertainty about which countries will actually supply 
natural gas. Key stakeholders articulate this problem about Nabucco project. Hungarian 
energy firm MOL’s CEO Mr. Josaf Molnar said that: “For the time being, there is no 
obvious source of gas and there is also much uncertainty about the volume of the 
necessary investments. As such we can't even begin to discuss the project's returns” 
(Nabucco gas supply uncertainty, 2012). Central Asian countries have been hesitant in 
supplying gas to Nabucco, which would eliminate Russia as an effective player in 
energy politics, because that decision will create tension with Russia.  
Financial costs of Nabucco project is also another concern. Jonathan Stern, director 
of gas research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, commented that: “I do not 
know how the Nabucco consortium arrived at the £7.9 billion figure in the first place. I 
could never see it costing less than £12 billion” (Dempsey, 2011). In Barysch’s report 
Nabucco project is summarized as “No demand, no supply, no money” (Barysch, 2011). 
According to these statements, Nabucco is not feasible project for Europe. Nabucco, 
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therefore, is bound to remain as an opera name instead of a radical project that would 
shake Russia’s dominance over natural gas supply to Europe.  
In addition to its internal weaknesses, Nabucco project faced with Russian 
encounter. The Russian government has sought to undermine Nabucco project. Russia 
tried to tighten its control over Central Asian countries which are potential candidates 
for natural gas supply for Nabucco. Europe and Russia competed over Turkmen gas. 
Russia made three energy agreements with Turkmenistan in 2003, 2007 and 2009, 
respectively. The 2007 agreement effectively undermined European hopes in entering 
the Turkmen gas market without Russian intermediation. In 2009, Russia interrupted gas 
imports from Turkmenistan due to the slump in Russian and European demand 
throughout this year. In December 2009, new agreement was reached. Turkmenistan 
would sell 30 bcm gas to Russia per year until 2020 (Fernandez, 2011). Nabucco’s main 
candidate for natural gas supply in the Central Asia continues to import its gas through 
Russia.  
In order to control the gas flow from the Caspian Basin to Europe Russia introduced 
South Stream pipeline project. This pipeline transports Russian gas from Russia to the 
Southern Europe. The pipeline route passes through the exclusive economic zones of 
Turkey and Bulgaria avoiding Ukraine (Fact Sheet The South Stream Offshore Pipeline, 
2013). By avoiding Ukraine, which poses a potential source of conflict, Russia wanted 
to offer energy supply security to Europe. Nevertheless, the South Stream is a 
competitor of Nabucco project. For reasons of both supply and demand only one could 
be financed and built (LeVine, 2013). The Caspian Sea and Central Asian natural gas are 
also diverted to South Stream pipeline. If South Stream is built, it will leave less Caspian 
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supplies for Nabucco (Baran, 2008). Russia tries to involve as much as natural gas from 
Azerbaijan into South Stream pipeline. Konstantin Simonov, the general director of the 
Foundation for energy security said that Russia can become main transit country for 
Azerbaijan’s gas destined for Europe by indicating that Azerbaijan is expected to 
increase its gas contribution to South Stream pipeline (Kharlamov, 2010). Besides 
Central Asian natural gas, Europe almost lost Azerbaijani natural gas as a result of 
Russian efforts. Russia weathers threat to its dominance over natural gas supply routes 
posed by Nabucco.  
Russia also engaged in gas pipeline project that would pressure the Caucasus states 
and solidify its control over the South Caucasus states. The Nord Stream pipeline project 
proposed by Russia aimed at bypassing transit states in supplying natural gas to Europe. 
Nord Stream is twin pipeline system through the Baltic Sea transporting natural gas from 
Russia to Europe (Nord Stream’s Twin Pipelines: Part of the Long-Term Solution for 
Europe’s Energy Security, 2013). This pipeline cut the need for transit countries- 
Georgia in the South Caucasus, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine in Eastern and Central 
Europe. Russia’s leverage against these countries has increased. 
Russia’s another strategy is to divide European countries. Many member states 
choose to make separate deals with Gazprom not to jeopardize inflows of Russian gas 
(Tekin and Williams, 2011). Nord Stream project prevents the EU from pursuing 
coherent policies towards the areas which Russia considers its sphere of influence by 
meeting the natural gas demand of Germany, which is the biggest economy of the EU. 
Former German chancellor Gerhard Schroder, who now works for the Gazprom led 
Baltic pipeline consortium states that: “Europe has no alternative to Russia as an energy 
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partner” (Matthews, 2006). In addition to two links that connect Germany and Russia, 
Russia has plans to build two more links to meet the British and Dutch natural gas 
demand (A Possible Nord Stream Expansion, 2013). If Russia manages to accomplish 
the expansion of Nord Stream, its political weight in Europe will increase. A Western 
diplomat comments that: “Are you going to be able to pick a fight with the guy who 
supplies all your energy” (Matthews, 2006). Russia feels more secure when Europe 
becomes dependent on its energy since energy dependent Europe’s expansion towards 
the sphere of influence of Russia would halt not to upset Russia.  
 
Figure 8: Nord Stream Project 
 
(A Possible Nord Stream Expansion, 2013). 
 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline was the last and decisive blow to European Nabucco. It 
connects Azerbaijani natural gas through Turkey, Greece, Albania, and ends in Italy. 
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Nabucco would have transported natural gas from Turkey’s western border to Austria 
(Ratner et al., 2013). Nabucco project was the most threatening project for Russia since 
it passed through Central and Eastern Europe, which are most reliant to Russia’s natural 
gas supplies, before connecting to the distribution hub in Austria (In Azerbaijan, a 
Winner Picked in Pipeline Competition, 2013). Trans-Adriatic Pipeline project can be 
considered as a compromise between Russia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan directly imports 
its natural gas to Europe but it avoids harming Russia’s energy relations with Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 9: TAP route 
 
(TAP's Development Timeline, 2012). 
Russia effectively uses energy as foreign policy instrument especially during Putin’s 
presidency. The gas and oil companies were brought into the state control. Control over 
gas and oil supply offers Russia political leverage against Europe. Europe seeks to 
diversify its energy supply in order to reduce its dependency on Russia. Europe wants to 
build new pipelines that would transport Caspian and Central Asian gas and oil sources 
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without including Russia’s territories. Nabucco project is the biggest project that would 
bring Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey and Central Europe. This 
project would weaken Russia’s control over the Caucasus and Central Europe and end 
Russia’s political leverage against Europe. Nevertheless, Russia tied Turkmen gas and 
reached a compromise with Azerbaijan. Nabucco project failed due to internal 
weaknesses and lack of supply sources.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
OTHER EXTERNAL POWERS IN THE CAUCASUS 
 
 
 
The international competition over the Caucasus has been shaped as a result of 
power vacuum after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The area started to attract the 
interest of Turkey, Iran, the EU and the USA. The reduction of Russian weight over the 
South Caucasus immediately after the Soviet collapse presented opportunity for these 
powers to increase their influence.   
 The Caspian energy resources constitute main object of interest for the external 
powers. The desire to connect Caspian energy resources to Europe has been considered 
not only as a geopolitical necessity but also a civilization project. This project has been 
perceived as a way of promoting European values throughout the region. The ambitious 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project asserts that pipelines, which connect Europe and the South 
Caucasus, will eventually bring full integration of the South Caucasus into European 
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institution and values. This will lead to improvements in the sphere of democracy, 
governance, transparency and human agency (Cornell and Ismailzade, 2005). It has been 
thought that the BTC would help to spread Western influence. However, the 
developments in the last decade have not demonstrated the victory of ideas. Instead, 
geographical proximity has been more relevant to the political developments in the 
Caucasus. Being far away from the Caucasus, Western influence has been limited. The 
regional powers especially Russia, Turkey and Iran have been much more active than 
the EU and the USA. In this part, when evaluating external powers other than Russia, 
the regional and extra-regional powers distinction is going to be made. Turkey and Iran 
as regional powers pose more formidable threat to Russia rather than extra-regional 
powers such as the EU and the USA.  
 
 
8. 1. Regional Powers  
 
 
8. 1. 1. Turkey 
 
Turkey has long term interests with the Caucasus region. Historically, the Caucasus 
has been area of competition between the Ottomans and Persians. The rise of the 
Russian Empire, however, challenged status of the Ottoman Empire and Persian Empire 
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in the Caucasus. The Caucasus was integrated into the structure of the Russian Empire 
and remained as a part of the Soviet Union. The break-up of the Soviet Union caused the 
establishment of independent states in the South Caucasus and power vacuum in the 
region. Turkey has been compelled to adopt new policies to respond this fundamental 
change in the region by initiating active foreign policy in the Caucasus.  
Turkey was among the first states which recognized the independence of the South 
Caucasus states. Turkey, from the beginning, has strongly endorsed the sovereignty and 
independence of the South Caucasus rather than being a simple rhetoric. Turkey helped 
the South Caucasus states to reinforce their political institutions and to build up their 
economic welfare (Aydın, 2010). For these emerging independent nations Turkey was 
considered as a model country with its democratic and secular political establishment 
and its free market economy. This role was encouraged by Turkey’s Western allies with 
the expectation that Turkey’s influence would limit the influence of Iran and Russia 
(Aras and Akpınar, 2011). Helping to provide stability and to establish free market 
economy and democratic institutions were related to strategic priority for Turkey’s 
policy in the region. Aydın claims that Turkish decision makers assumed that the 
democratic and secular institutions would make the South Caucasus states powerful 
enough to resist outside pressure and interventions. Then, Turkey’s historical, political, 
economic, and strategic regional pull will gently push these states towards Turkey’s 
orbit (Aydın, 2010). However, in 1990s, Turkey was in political and economic turmoil. 
This ambitious foreign policy goal in the region could not be fulfilled by Turkey due to 
economic and political constrains. Regional conflicts also shaped Turkey’s foreign 
policy towards the South Caucasus. Turkey’s energy deals with Russia cast a shadow 
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over Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s diplomatic relations with 
the South Caucasus developed in the region case by case.   
Turkey’s most important ally in the region is Azerbaijan. ‘One nation-two states’ is 
the slogan to describe the bilateral relations (Evoyan, 2013). Turkey’s relations with 
Azerbaijan are determined by ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historical connections. 
Energy pipeline projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum also 
form the important dimensions of the relationship (Aras and Akpınar, 2011). Turkey 
imposed a full economic embargo on Armenia and closed its border with Armenia in 
1993 amid the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the following years, many broad 
agreements and protocols were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey, including a 
border protocol in 1997 and an agreement on training and assistance for Azerbaijan’s 
State Border Service by Turkey’s armed forces in 2003 (Azerbaijan and Turkey's 
Evolving Military Ties, 2013). However, Turkey-Armenian rapprochement process in 
2009 caused controversy in Azerbaijan. The Zurich Protocols signed between Turkey 
and Armenia did not set a pre-condition of the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
problem. Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release that declared that 
Turkey’s decision clearly contradicts with national interests of Azerbaijan (Shiriyev and 
Davies 2013). Moreover, Azerbaijan threatened to raise gas prices that it sells to Turkey 
(Mikhelidze, 2010). Turkey responded by abandoning talks with Armenia and tying 
normalization between countries to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In 
2010 Turkey established a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan that prioritized security 
cooperation and assistance (Azerbaijan and Turkey's Evolving Military Ties, 2013). 
Opening border with Armenia will boost Turkey’s economy but Turkey could not afford 
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losing its most important ally in the region. Turkey needs Azerbaijan for its energy 
demand. Azerbaijan also needs Turkey to follow a balanced foreign policy. The strong 
collaboration between Azerbaijan and Turkey balances strong Russian-Armenian 
alliance in the South Caucasus. It also prevents Russia to consolidate its grip on 
Azerbaijan fully.   
The relations between Turkey and Georgia are close since the independence of 
Georgia. Turkey has supported the political development and restructuring of the 
economy of Georgia and kept it as a close ally (Aras and Akpınar, 2011). Georgia is 
important for Turkey because of Georgia’s geographical position in the South Caucasus. 
Since the border with Armenia are closed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
Georgia acts as a transit state between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Georgia is situated on the 
route of energy supplies from the Caspian Sea (Kononczuk, 2008). Major pipeline 
projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Erzurum pipeline could not have 
been realized without Georgia’s inclusion. Beside cooperation on energy and political 
aspects, two countries have formed a strong economic relationship. Turkey is the biggest 
trade partner and second biggest investor in Georgia, leading to Free Trade Agreement 
between the two countries in 2007. Moreover, Turkish companies took an active part in 
developing Georgian infrastructure forming 23% of the total foreign investment to 
Georgia (Aydın, 2010).  
On the other hand, Georgia’s domestic problems colored Turkey’s relations with 
Georgia. Officially, Turkey supports Georgian territorial integrity. However, Abkhazian 
issue complicates Turkish-Georgian relations. The presence of an Abkhazian population 
in Turkey has some influence on Turkish policy regarding this problem (Kononczuk, 
104 
 
2008). Turkey attempted to bring two sides together and offered alternative openings by 
advocating a peaceful resolution of the dispute (Aydın, 2010). However, August war in 
2008 showed the futility of Turkey’s attempts. The crisis put Turkey into a difficult 
position. Turkey did not want an open confrontation Russia from which Turkey imports 
substantial amount of natural gas. As a response to August war, Turkey proposed the 
establishment the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform in hopes that conflicts 
may be resolved within the region through cooperation and new policies developed by 
the respective countries (Aras and Akpınar, 2011). This organization would challenge 
the supremacy of Russia in the Caucasian affairs and offer Turkey a regional status. 
Thus, this proposal has not materialized. Turkey’s ambitions were restricted by Russia 
once again. 
Turkey’s biggest obstacle that complicates its South Caucasus policy is Nagorno-
Karabakh issue. Turkey supported Azerbaijan through the supply of arms and military 
advisers during the military phase of the conflict 1991-1994, and at the political and 
diplomatic areas in the subsequent period due to its linguistic, ethnic and historic ties 
with Azerbaijan (Minasyan, 2010).  The unresolved status of the conflict prevents 
Turkey to realize its ambitions in the South Caucasus by blocking its access to region 
due to the close borders with Armenia. Moscow successfully benefits from the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict to prevent Turkey from a getting a foothold in the Caucasus through 
Azerbaijan (Cornell, 1998). Turkey, which would normalize its relations with Armenia, 
would open its borders with Armenia and connect with Azerbaijan geographically but 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue blocks normalization attempts. In 2009, Turkey and Armenia 
agreed on a comprehensive framework for normalization of their bilateral relations. Six 
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months later, the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers signed two protocols for 
establishing diplomatic relations and opening the land border that contained no 
preconditions regarding the Karabakh conflict. However, within a few weeks, Turkish 
parliamentarians from the ruling party and the opposition insisted that normalization 
would proceed after progress was made on the Karabakh conflict (Welt, 2013). Turkey 
wants to avoid antagonizing its most important ally in the region, Azerbaijan. Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan stated that: “Nagorno-Karabakh problem is as important for Turkey as 
it is for Azerbaijan” (Suleymanov, 2013). Turkey has to manage delicate diplomacy 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey’s energy relations with Azerbaijan discourage 
Turkey to dismiss sentiments of Azerbaijani people whereas without reaching a solution 
to Nagorno-Karabakh problem, it is difficult to normalize relations between Turkey and 
Armenia.  
Energy aspect constitutes an important part of Turkey’s South Caucasus strategy. 
Turkey is heavily dependent on energy imports since it does not have any significant 
energy resources. It imports gas from Russia and oil from the Middle East (Efe, 2011). 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project is the major achievement for Turkey. The BTC’s 
importance lies in geopolitical consequences instead of economic reasons. Relative to its 
GDP, the direct revenue that Turkey will receive is admittedly smaller than Azerbaijan 
and Georgia will receive. Turkey is expected to receive $140 and $200 million annually 
(Baran, 2005). The BTC is an important step for Turkey to realize its dreams as an 
energy hub country. The BTC is the first transnational pipeline that transports the 
Caspian basin resources without crossing Russian soil (Efe, 2011). Aydın commented 
that the BTC project would secure Turkey’s role as an energy player in the Caspian 
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region (Aydın, 2010). Turkey’s influence on the South Caucasus has increased as a 
result of the construction of the BTC. The relationship level between the South Caucasus 
states and Turkey has been upgraded. Thanks to regular meeting in each other’s capitals, 
government officials from the three states have become much familiar with one another. 
This familiarization process has been enhanced with the extensive military and technical 
assistance provided by Turkey (Baran, 2005).  
Nabucco project can also be an example of Turkish ambitions in the South Caucasus. 
This project aims at linking natural gas resources from Azerbaijan and possibly Iran, 
Iraq and Turkmenistan to Europe. A joint declaration was signed among Turkey, 
Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, and witnessed by representatives of other countries on 
July 19, 2009. The planned 3, 3300 kilometer pipeline, expected to carry 31 billion cubic 
meters of gas annually by the end of the decade, is planned to come online in 2014 
(Aydın, 2010). Nabucco project would have boosted Turkey’s position in the Caspian 
region since Turkey could serve as a key country in transporting Caspian natural gas 
resources to Europe by bypassing Russia. Russia would have lost a great deal of 
leverage against Europe and the South Caucasus. However, due to the costs of the 
project and uncertainty about supply Nabucco project failed. Other competing projects 
such as the South Stream and TANAP prevailed over Nabucco. 
On 26 June 2012, Azerbaijan and Turkey agreed to build a new natural gas pipeline, 
named TANAP, to transport Azerbaijani natural gas from the Georgian border across to 
the EU. This project runs from the Greek border and transport to Italy via an Adriatic 
subsea section rather than Central Europe that Nabucco assumes (Yeni, 2013). Turkey 
will receive 6 billion cubic meters of gas which will reduce its dependency on Russian 
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gas. Besides, the Azerbaijani gas is relatively cheaper for Turkey than Russian and Iran. 
Azerbaijan state company SOCAR has 80% of TANAP share. It has obtained the right 
to sell gas on the territory of Turkey (Pamir, 2012). Although this project bypasses 
Russian territories, Russian interests in Central Europe are not threatened with TANAP. 
In this aspect, TANAP can be considered as a sign of compromise between Turkey and 
Russia in transporting the Caspian energy resources.  
Turkey’s ambitions in the South Caucasus are restricted by Russia’s strong presence 
in the region. The closed borders with Armenia and hostility with this country limits 
Turkey’s reach to the region. The political evolution in Georgia is another setback for 
Turkey since the new president of Georgia takes a much more conciliatory position 
against Russia. However, the region experiences constant changes. The recent US-Iran 
rapprochement will bring geopolitical shifts which Turkey might benefit from. The 
strong collaboration between Iran and Russia would not be seen in future because 
internationally rehabilitated Iran’s cautious policy in the South Caucasus will not last. 
This will create rooms for more active Turkish policies because Turkey will consider 
buying natural gas from Iran to reduce its dependency on Russia. Turkey has already 
started. On November 29, Davutoğlu met with Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in 
Vienna. In December Davutoğlu visited Yerevan and met with several Armenian 
officials. Turkey also supported Georgia’s attempts to join free trade agreement with the 
EU. In this case, penetration of the Turkish public and private investments in Georgia 
will increase (Агаджанян, 2013). Turkey’s latest attempts in the Caucasus would be 
implicitly tolerated by Russia in order to counter another rising threat, Iran. Turkey 
might benefit from a possible rivalry that would be experienced between Iran and Russia 
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to increase its influence over the Caucasus. Turkey would be a useful ally for both 
Russia and Iran in their attempts to limit the influence one over the Caucasus.  
 
 
8. 1. 2. Iran 
 
The Caucasus is not totally irrelevant to Iran although the strategic perspective of 
Iran focused on the Middle East. Iran shares borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iran 
had participated in the competition between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Since 
ancient times and up to nineteenth century, this region was on numerous occasions a part 
of Iranian realm (Djalili, 2002). The competition among three big empires over the 
Caucasus resulted in Russia’s victory. During the Soviet era, the activities of Iran and 
Turkey in the Caucasus had been limited.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union has led to the reemergence of Iran in the South 
Caucasus. Iran’s foreign goals in the South Caucasus are to diminish the influence of the 
Western powers, to achieve a balance of power vis-à-vis other regional players (Russia 
and Turkey) in the South Caucasus, to gain a foothold in the region through economic 
and cultural expansion and to neutralize the possible threats (Sharashenidze, 2011). 
Iran’s Caucasus policy can be defined as cautious. Its goals in the regions are mainly 
defensive. Since Iran has been threatened constantly by the USA and Sunni powers in 
the Middle East, it concentrated its forces in the Middle East to prevent a possible attack 
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to Iran. Therefore, it has tried to preserve friendly relations with Russia by avoiding a 
high profile in the Caucasus. 
As Turkey is connected with Azerbaijan through ethnic and cultural ties, Iran is 
connected with Azerbaijan through religion. Majority of Persians like Azerbaijan 
population are Muslim Shiites. Besides, Persian culture has seriously affected 
Azerbaijan during the centuries. Modern territory of Azerbaijan had been part of Persian 
Empire for centuries (Chitadze, 2012). However, Azerbaijan emerged as a secular 
country unlike Iran. Iran is trying to boost Islamic sentiments through its diplomatic and 
religious missions (Sharashenidze, 2011). Fearing that Iran uses Shia card as a political 
tool, Azerbaijan feels threatened by Iran’s activities. Thus, this religious affinity causes 
friction between two countries instead of solidarity.  
Another factor that deteriorates the relationship level between Iran and Azerbaijan is 
the presence of Azerbaijani population in Iran. Iran contains 22-30 million strong 
Azerbaijan minority. Ever since Azerbaijan’s independence, Iran has been suspicious 
that Baku might use ethnic card to pressure Iran (Valiyev, Azerbaijan-Iran Relations: 
Quo Vadis, Baku?, 2012). This factor is a potential threat for Iran. The unity of Iran is at 
stake in the case of possible separation scenarios. Iran’s strained relations with 
Azerbaijan affect Iran’s South Caucasus policy. To balance Azerbaijan in the region, 
Iran has established close relations with Armenia. 
Despite their religious and cultural differences, geography dictates the close 
collaboration between Iran and Armenia. Armenia sees Iran as a way of 
counterbalancing the activities of Turkey in the South Caucasus. Iran considers Armenia 
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a buffer to Turkish and Azerbaijani influence on the northwest borders of its country 
(Djalili, 2002). For Armenia, Iran is a way of relieving the effects of blockade imposed 
by Turkey. Levor-Ter Petrosyan, the former president of Armenia, admitted that, 
without Iran, his country would suffocate in a few days (Sharashenidze, 2011). Iran 
cannot completely compete with Russia’s dominance in Armenia so it is unlikely that 
Iran’s relationship with Armenia will disturb Russia.  
Iran’s relations with Georgia less developed. Iran does not share common borders 
with Georgia. Nevertheless, Iran has geopolitical considerations concerning its Georgian 
policy. Iran envisions the possibility of laying out a transit route via Armenia or 
Azerbaijan in order to access the port of Poti on the Black Sea (Djalili, 2002). Iran 
maintains a low profile in Georgia. Bilateral trade remains insignificant whereas Turkey 
is Georgia’s number one trade partner and the Russian-Georgian trade volume is much 
higher than the level of exchange between Georgia and Iran. Iran does not even enter the 
top of ten of Georgia’s trade partners (Sharashenidze, 2011). However, new regional 
developments caused close relations between two countries. The war between Russia 
and Georgia has opened a new chapter of bilateral cooperation. Georgia considered 
replacing Russian gas with gas imported from Azerbaijan and Iran. Moreover, Iran and 
Georgia agreed to swap electricity via Armenia (Chitadze, 2012). This indicates that Iran 
is eager to play role in the region although it keeps a low profile today.  
Besides bilateral relations, Iran’s main concern in the South Caucasus is the status of 
the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea is bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Iran. The Caspian Sea, which has one of the largest energy reserves in 
the world, has become a serious bone of contention among the littoral states. New states 
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established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union rejected 1921 and 1940 treaties 
between Iran and the Soviet Union, which indicated all littoral states can enjoy joint use 
of the Caspian Sea and insisted on creating a new legal regime (Behzadi, 2010). The 
new problem arises from whether the Caspian Sea is a sea or a lake. If the Caspian Sea is 
a lake, the use of resources must be allocated jointly. If the Caspian Sea is a sea, then 
resources should be divided into national sectors (Olsen, 2012). Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan emphasize that the Caspian Sea is a sea and is governed by the International 
Law of the Sea. Iran and Turkmenistan claim that the legal regime of a lake governs the 
Caspian Sea (Behzadi, 2010). The sea based division favors Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan. Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan support a modified median line 
approach. According to the MML, Russia and Azerbaijan acquire 20 percent, 
Kazakhstan acquires 30 percent, Turkmenistan acquires almost 17 percent and Iran 
acquires 13 percent (Diba, 2009).  
Median Line approach limits Iran’s gains from the Caspian Sea resources. Iran’s best 
option is joint distribution of the Caspian Sea. Iran emphasized that the Caspian Sea is a 
body of water which does not any natural link to the open seas or oceans and, according 
to the international Law of the Sea, some large bodies of water entirely surrounded by 
dry land are known as lakes, others as sea. Therefore, the International Law of the Sea is 
not applicable to the Caspian Sea. Iran suggested that the exclusive coastal zone be 
increased to 20 miles and the rest be condominium for all the littoral states (Behzadi, 
2010). Russia stands as a big obstacle for Iran to realize this foreign policy aim. Russia 
made bilateral agreements with other littoral states. In 2002, Russia signed an agreement 
with Kazakhstan concerning the status of the Caspian Sea. In September 2002, Russia 
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and Azerbaijan signed an agreement. In February 2003, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
signed an agreement. The negotiations between Iran and Russia about the Caspian Sea in 
2001 did not produce results (Lee, 2005). Iran has been left alone concerning the 
Caspian Sea division. In 2009, the leaders of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan met in Kazakhstan’s Caspian port for the discussion over the Caspian Sea 
cooperation. Iran was not invited (Behzadi, 2010). Iran could not pursue an ambitious 
and active policy since it prioritizes its security threatened by the USA. Russia benefits 
from the hostility between Iran and the USA and does not give concessions to Iran over 
the status of the Caspian Sea.  
Although Iran borders two South Caucasus states and a regional power in the 
Caucasus, its activities in the region are limited. US threat of invasion caused Iran to 
prioritize its policies in the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East to counter a possible 
invasion. Iran did not want to antagonize Russia which supports its nuclear enrichment 
program. Therefore, Iran does not present itself as an ambitious player in the Caucasus. 
If Iran reaches a deal with Western countries concerning its nuclear enrichment program, 
it will be freed from US pressure and it can project itself as a more active regional 
player. Therefore, the recent US-Iran rapprochement might have implications for the 
Caucasus in long term. Iran might increase its activities in the South Caucasus after 
being freed from international sanctions. Iran’s position vis-à-vis Russia will be 
strengthened since its international isolation will be relieved. Thus, Iran would not be 
careful not to upset Russia with its activities in the South Caucasus. Iran’s active 
involvement in energy deals in the South Caucasus might revive Europe’s hopes of 
113 
 
diversifying its energy supply. The regional dynamics and energy geopolitics might shift 
because of the US-Iran rapprochement.  
 
 
8. 2. Extra-Regional Powers 
 
 
8. 2. 1. The USA 
 
The emergence of the newly established independent states created complex 
questions regarding the role of the USA in the South Caucasus immediately after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The USA does not have historical connection with the 
region. Lack of experience and lack of attention were important factors that complicate 
US policy towards the South Caucasus. Nobody in the American academia knew much 
about these places. Few people had been there and those who had been generally were 
tourists (Khelashvili and Macfarlane, 2010). Even the current US foreign policy does not 
prioritize the South Caucasus. US engagement in the Middle East overshadows US 
interests in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, European involvement in the region 
brings about US involvement.  
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Azerbaijan is the most critical country for the USA due to its geopolitical position. 
Brzezinski describes Azerbaijan as the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the 
Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. The independence of the Central Asian states can 
be rendered meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow’s control. 
The way in ensuring Azerbaijan’s independence is linking Azerbaijan resources to 
Western markets by pipelines that do not pass through Russian controlled territory 
(Brzezinski, 1998). American strategy followed Brzezinski’s premises in 1990s. The 
Clinton administration pushed hard for Azerbaijani oil to be shipped via Turkey, along 
the Baku-Ceyhan route, instead of north to Novorossiysk (Olcott, 2002). Bypassing 
Russian territory in transportation of Azerbaijani oil and gas would mean reduction of 
Russian influence over its periphery and Europe. Moreover, as Brzezinski stated 
Azerbaijan has been a key to reaching Central Asia, Azerbaijan served as a major 
transshipment point for supplies to Afghanistan (Friedman, 2013). Azerbaijan has 
enormous importance for the USA to increase its position in the region and to limit 
Russia’s influence and leverage.  
Energy security constitutes main pillar of the US policy towards the Caucasus. The 
Caucasus is an important energy route for gas and oil. European energy security is 
important for the USA because the USA and the EU have the largest trade relationship 
in the world (Koushakjian, 2011). The USA wants to ensure that gas and oil keeps 
flowing to Europe for its commercial interests. Russian blackmail to cut off energy 
supply not only harms European interests but also US interests. Therefore, the USA has 
engaged in several oil projects in the South Caucasus. Especially Azerbaijan has become 
an attractive magnet for the USA. Chevron, ExxonMobil, Unocal, and Amerada Hess 
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have stakes in oil projects. Since the merger of BP and Amoco, the US has become a 
greater stakeholder in Azerbaijan’s largest oil project, which was the development deep 
water portions of Gunashli, which BP agreed to develop in a 30-year contract signed in 
September 1994, which created the Azerbaijan International Oil Operating Company 
(Olcott, 2002). Besides the development of energy resources, the USA has contributed to 
European attempts in diversification of energy routes. It offered political and financial 
support to the projects such as the Caspian Sea Consortium, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, and the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (Khelashvili and Macfarlane, 2010). The 
goal of these projects was to secure energy flow to Europe by bypassing Russia.  
Azerbaijan’s cooperation is crucial for the realization of this goal.  
On the other hand, strategic considerations do not always direct US policy towards 
Azerbaijan. The ethnic politics of the USA affected the development of American 
Azerbaijan policy. The strong Armenian-American lobby is hostile to Azerbaijan due to 
Nagorno-Karabakh problem. There is pressure on Congress to block weapon shipments, 
and even appointing ambassadors is difficult (Friedman, 2013). Clinton has repeatedly 
pledged for removing the US Congress sanctions against Azerbaijan. After 9/11 events, 
the USA declared war on terrorism. The first target was Afghanistan. This development 
increased the importance of Azerbaijan’s position in the map. In 2002, Bush stated that 
the USA has realized how detrimental sanctions had been to the US national interests for 
years and waived the sanctions (Baban and Shiriyev, 2013). Geopolitical considerations 
overwhelmed the attempts of Armenian lobby after the USA faced a threat in the Central 
Asia. 
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The Armenian lobby encouraged the development of the relations with Armenia and 
the USA. For decades the focus of American Armenians has been winning official 
recognition by the US government that the incidents that occurred in 1915 between the 
Ottomans and Armenians constituted an act of genocide. Every April the Congress pass 
a resolution that recognizes the events as genocide. A constant source of bitterness for 
American Armenians is the fact that virtually all presidential candidates have promised 
to recognize the genocide during election campaign in order to gain the votes of 
American Armenians, and later reneged on that promise, fearing an angry reaction from 
Turkey (Zolyan, 2010). These same groups advocated the USA to provide a significant 
amount of financial assistance to Armenia. In 2000, $124 million US assistance was 
allocated to Armenia (Olcott, 2002). Turkish-Armenian relations constitute one of the 
most important issues from the point of view of American policy. The USA has 
advocated the normalization between two countries. On April 23, 2009, Armenian-
Turkish statement about the existence of a roadmap for normalization came about in part 
thanks to the serious involvement of American diplomacy (Zolyan, 2010). The support 
of the USA for normalization between Armenia and Turkey aimed at reducing Russian 
dominance over Armenia. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem prevented the 
success of these efforts.  
Georgia is an important country for the USA for its attempts to diversify energy 
routes and to limit Russia’s access to the South Caucasus. Therefore, the USA has 
supported Georgia politically and financially since its independence. The creation of 
Georgia as an energy corridor for the Caspian basin is one important element of US 
policy in the region (Olcott, 2002). The USA also worked towards the withdrawal of 
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Russian bases in Georgia, an effort which culminated in the Istanbul Declaration of 
1999, where Russia committed to remove its bases at Vaziani, and Gudauta by July 
2011. In addition, the USA supported Georgia’s NATO membership (Khelashvili and 
Macfarlane, 2010). The Bush Administration improved the level of US commitment to 
Georgia. US bilateral military assistance to Georgia has increased especially after the 
rise of pro-Western president Saakashvili. The United States held up Georgia to the 
world as an example of the fruits of Western democracy promotion efforts and proof that 
democracy could still spread to unimagined parts of the world (Cooley and Mitchell, 
2009). However, the war occurred between Russia and Georgia in 2008 proved that US 
commitment to Georgia consists of empty talk. Georgia did not receive the support it 
needed from the USA during the five day war. The US or NATO troops did not help 
Georgia as Saakashvili argued. This war also demonstrated the limits of US power and 
commitment in the region.  
The USA has decreased its interest in the South Caucasus since Russian-Georgian 
war. The failure of Nabucco project can be shown as a sign of weakness on the part of 
the US in this project. Without strong political backing from Washington it was very 
difficult to overcome Russian opposition to build this pipeline (Ismailzade, 2010). US 
attempts in the region has been disrupted by Russia. The resurgence of Russia in the 
Caucasus prevented the USA from realizing its goals.  
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8. 2. 2. The EU 
 
The Caucasus holds importance to Europe. After the Soviet Union’s withdrawal 
from the region the Caucasus emerged as a key area which connects Europe to Central 
Asia. EU’s aspiration of becoming an important player in the world politics is linked 
with its relations with the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus with its natural 
resources and its links with Central Asia can lessen European energy dependence on 
Russia.  
The EU has launched several financial projects for the South Caucasus. TRACECA 
project launched in 1993 aims at connecting the Black and Caspian Seas by means of 
modern transport and communication systems and developing a coherent and integrated 
transport infrastructure within the region (Dekanozishvili, 2004). This project was 
important geopolitically and economically because it enables the EU to reach to Central 
Asia in which the countries also gained their independence. Thus, the EU attempted to 
created new markets for its goods. The states in the Caucasus and Central Asia would 
have consolidated their economic and political independence immediately after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. This visionary project, however, was allowed to slip into 
oblivion (Cornell and Starr, 2006). The EU missed a great opportunity in solidifying its 
relationship with the region when Russia was weak by not insisting on TRACECA 
project.   
The development of a Caucasian energy corridor is an important element of 
European policy toward the Caucasus. The EU’s main goal has been to prevent Russia 
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from monopolizing its control over energy route. Thus, the EU has sought to develop 
Southern Corridor for energy transportation. INOGATE project was initiated by the EU 
in 1995 to support regional cooperation among the South Caucasus. It provides for the 
expansion and modernization of energy infrastructure of the South Caucasus states 
(Dekanozishvili, 2004). The construction of the BTC was a milestone in connecting 
Caspian energy resources to Europe. BTC has been followed by the construction of the 
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline linking the Shah Deniz gas fields in the Caspian with the 
Turkish energy system and Europe (Cornell and Starr, 2006). The BTC and the South 
Gas Pipeline have increased the importance of the South Caucasus for Europe. The 
completion of the pipeline projects raised the prospects of connecting not only Caspian 
energy resources but also Central Asian energy resources with Europe.  
The EU has sought to secure its energy supply by developing energy pipeline 
projects. The South Caucasus is a key transit area for the EU to transport the Caspian 
and Central Asian energy resources. However, political and financial obstacles 
prevented the EU from building the pipelines that would reduce its dependency on 
Russia. Nabucco project was proposed to link Europe with former Soviet states in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia. Nabucco aimed at not only securing additional supply 
of resources-they are also aimed at intensifying cooperation with former Soviet states 
(Wisniewski, 2011). This project was a direct threat to Russia. Russia could not have 
used energy card against Europe if this project have been realized. Russia’s control over 
the Central Asian states would have diminished. The EU, however, could not realize this 
project due to uncertainty of energy suppliers and financial problems.  
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The Trans-Caspian project is another project that would bring Turkmen gas to 
Azerbaijan, across the Caspian Sea. This project would also make Nabucco more viable 
(Dispatch: Energy Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union, 2011). However, this 
project also failed because of Turkmenistan’s unwillingness to circumvent Russian 
route. The leadership of Turkmenistan has avoided upsetting Russian interests by 
supplying gas to this project (Chow and Hendrix, 2010).   
The continuation of the regional conflicts that enabled Russian intervention to the 
South Caucasus has been major obstacle of the EU attempts to promote development of 
energy projects, economic prosperity, and stability in the region. The conflicts in the 
South Caucasus, therefore, are of critical importance to the EU. The EU has recognized 
this threat. The EU Security Strategy of 2003 stated that violent conflict, weak states 
where organized crime flourishes and dysfunctional societies pose problems for Europe. 
Therefore, the EU should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems 
of the South Caucasus (Whitman and Wolff, 2006).  
 European efforts of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus concentrated on 
Georgia because of Georgia’s position as a transit country in big energy projects such 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. 
Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s engagement in the conflicts over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia was limited to humanitarian assistance. Since 2003 the EU has also had a special 
representative for the South Caucasus, whose job is to contribute towards conflict 
resolution in the region, such as by aiding political and economic reforms (Hoe-Yeong, 
2011).  
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The lack of coherent and comprehensive strategy prevented the EU from being an 
effective conflict manager in the region. The EU often merely reacts to developments 
rather than defining a clear strategic vision (Whitman and Wolff, 2006). Russia-
Georgian war in 2008 was an example of this deficiency of the EU. The EU was not able 
to prevent the war and the EU could not help Georgia militarily. Second, the EU did not 
receive all the style points when mediating the cease-fire since the conditions remained 
vague and not completely implemented. Third, so far the EU has not been able to bring 
the parties toward a lasting peace. Finally, it was unclear to what extent the success 
could have been attributed to France rather than the EU (Forsberg and Seppo, 2010). 
Moreover, during the crisis another special representative was appointed to take charge 
of the crisis. The EU was represented in the Geneva talks by special representative for 
the crisis in Georgia instead of special representative for the South Caucasus (Whitman 
and Wolff, 2006). This indicates that the EU acts on ad-hoc basis rather than acting 
based on general strategy in the South Caucasus.  
The European Neighborhood Policy is an important project that directs European 
relations between the EU and the South Caucasus but its deficiencies prevent it from an 
effective measure. The policy covers 16 countries of Southern Mediterranean, Eastern 
Mediterranean and the states of the South Caucasus (Kopeček, 2011). The ENP is 
geopolitical policy which intended to create a semi-periphery for the EU. This policy is 
designed to widen to scope of the EU yet at the same time excluding further enlargement 
(Marchetti, 2006). In the South Caucasus the EU declares its goals based on Action 
Plans prepared for each country. The EU offers financial assistance in exchange for 
completion of economic and political reforms outlined in the Action Plans. (Kopeček, 
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2011). Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is listed as a priority area for Armenia and Azerbaijan 
in the ENP. The countries are encouraged to increase diplomatic efforts and support a 
peaceful solution to the conflict. The EU invites parties of the conflict to hold face to 
face contacts for the resolution of the conflict (Poghosyan, 2009). Although the EU 
listed its suggestions for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its contribution to the resolution of 
the conflict has been limited. The ENP lacks stick and carrot to enforce its action plans. 
If the EU financial assistance is withdrawn, Russia or other regional powers will fill the 
gap. Since the EU does not commit itself to integrate the states, which are under the 
ENP, to the EU body, there is no real incentive for these states to realize the priorities 
listed in the ENP.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this study, I have examined Russian policies towards to the Caucasus after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. Throughout the study, I utilized geopolitical tradition to 
analyze Russia’s policies in the North Caucasus and Russia’s relations with the South 
Caucasus republics. Geopolitics explores the impact of geography upon the state’s 
actions. In this context, I presented the prominent thinkers in the history of geopolitics. 
There are two main arguments in geopolitics traditions. Mahan argued the primacy of 
sea power, whereas Mackinder contended that any state that provided its domination 
over Eurasian heartland will prevail over sea power. This dichotomy has constituted the 
main discussion in classical geopolitics and has affected other geopolitical thinkers.  
Mackinder’s theory has been more relevant to Russia, which has been a land power 
throughout its history. As a land power, Russia’s weakness lies in its indefensibility. In 
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order to secure its core, Russian state has attempted to create buffer zones in its 
periphery. The expansion of Tsarist Empire could be considered in the context of this 
concern. The Soviet Union also followed same imperative by organizing Europe after 
the Second World War to secure its borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union created 
Russia’s position in the world. Although several traditions have been developed after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, pragmatic Eurasianism has been the dominant discourse 
reflected in Russian foreign policy documents. In these documents, it is stated that, 
Russia wants to reassert its control over former-Soviet republics. Moreover, Russia 
wants to be considered as an equal partner in international setting. Maintaining its 
monopoly on energy routes to Europe is important for Russia. This provides political 
leverage to Russia against Europe. Russia, therefore, engages in policies that prevent 
Europe from developing direct links with countries which export gas and oil in the 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia.   
The Caucasus is located in an area which connects the Caspian and Central Asian 
resources with Europe. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to power vacuum in the 
region. The loss of the control over the Caucasus would reduce Russia’s position vis-à-
vis Europe by presenting opportunity for Europe to diversify its energy routes. The 
Caucasus is also a buffer zone for Russia to secure its southern border from its powerful 
neighbors such as Turkey and Iran. Russia’s security is closely linked with its position in 
the Caucasus. Russia, therefore, tries to maintain its influence over the region.  
Russia’s South Caucasus policy consists of three main pillars: political, economic 
and military. Russia invited the South Caucasus states to join into Commonwealth of 
Independent States organization to influence the politics of the South Caucasus states. 
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Russia tries to position the CIS as an intermediate power for the conflicts exist among 
the South Caucasus states. Thus, it tries to prevent the involvement of other regional and 
global powers into the affairs of the South Caucasus. Russia also benefits from regional 
conflicts to place its troops in the region. Thus, it has found military means to exert 
pressure upon the South Caucasus republics. In energy field, Russia tries to prevent 
energy deals between European countries and the South Caucasus states which would 
bypass its territory.  
Russia’s dominance over the South Caucasus is mostly felt in Armenia. Armenia’s 
economic infrastructure has been almost completely owned by Russian companies. In 
political field, Armenia declared its intention to join to the Eurasian Union. On the other 
hand, Azerbaijan and Georgia want to get rid of yokes of their former lord. In order to 
pursue more independent policies, Azerbaijan and Georgia emphasize on collaboration 
with European countries. Russia tries to prevent the development of close relations with 
European countries and the South Caucasus countries.  
In the North Caucasus Russia has encountered separatism movements in post-Cold 
War era. In 1994 and 1999 it engaged in two full scale wars with Chechnya. Although it 
suppressed separatism movement in Chechnya, the violence and insurgency has spread 
throughout the region. Russia now attempts to deal with insurgency by placing loyal 
rulers in local republics. It also allocates significant amount of subsidies from the federal 
budget. Despite economic and military costs it is imperative for Russia to control the 
North Caucasus in order to strengthen its territorial integrity and to extend its influence 
to the South Caucasus. 
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Besides regional states and groups, Russia competes with regional and extra-regional 
powers for hegemony in the Caucasus. Regional powers are Turkey and Iran while 
extra-regional powers are the EU and the USA. Geography prevents the USA and the 
EU from implementing effective measures to overwhelm Russian influence on the South 
Caucasus. However, Iran and Turkey are much more severe adversaries of Russian 
supremacy in the South Caucasus. Although, none of these powers could severely 
challenge Russian dominance in the region, new regional developments might alter 
balance of power. US-Iran rapprochement has opened up a possibility for a geopolitical 
shift in the region. A rehabilitated Iran in the international arena with its energy 
resources might emerge as an active player in the South Caucasus. Iran’s close energy 
collaboration with Turkey and Europe might bring new energy projects in the Caspian 
Basin, which will upset Russian interests.  
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